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ABSTRACT 
This study had as its purpose an attempt to establish on· 
empirical grounds the ~ole firearms ccinfrol laws play in 
South African society. A hol ist methodological position was 
adopted from among the alternatives avai I able for scientific 
social research, and the structural-functional theoretical 
framework of the main I ine tradition was employed for the 
purposes of the analysis. Accordingly, legislation was defined 
as serving a primarily integrative function in society, 
(integration being functionally one of four system imperatives), 
by translating prevai I ing values and norms into a stable, 
attributive code. 
A discussion of general historical and contemporary perspectives 
related to purpose(s), role, and efficacy of restrictive 
firearms legislation preceded a survey of the development of 
gun controls in the Republic of South Africa. Current legislative 
provisions in this context were then dealt with in some detai I. 
Research into the official documentary reports of the S.A.Department 
of Statistics (i.e., the Report on Deaths, and Statistics of 
Offences), and the Annual Report of the Commissioner of the South 
African Pol ice, covering a period of years, was carried out and 
although some of the required statJstical information was inadequate, 
or entirely non-existent, it was finally concluded on the basis of 
avai I able evidence that such legislation is enacted in this society 
on the assumption that it serves the purposes of crime reduction 
and civi I peace. This assumption was shown to be empirically 
unsupported, and an alternative approach was cal led for in terms 
of which legislators should place greater positive emphasis on 
the individual right to keep and bear arms. It was concluded 
that such a shift of emphasis would more effectively promote 
the defined role of legislation in South African society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is, as its title suggests, to analyse 
the role in South African society of laws which are specifically 
directed towards bringing the private possession of firearms 
under restrictive administrative control. We are therefore 
not here concerned with the relations between governments in 
terms of mi I itary weapons, arms embargos, the "arms race" and 
the fear of nuclear holocaust, together with the myriad problems 
faced by the international community at state level and dictated 
by economic and/or ideological considerations. In this analysis 
we are simply concerned with the relations between governments 
and the people they govern, with particular reference to the 
Republic of South Africa, on the question of the individual 
civi I ian ownership of firearms. 
Approached from the point of view of a social scientist the 
problem thus formulated requires, prior to any empirical effort, 
that the concept of legislation be clarified and its general role 
in society defined before the role of any specific form can be 
identified and its efficacy measured. In adopting, therefore 
the framework provided by contemporary sociological theory of the 
main I ine tradition, we are confronted with the notion of social 
legislation as fulfi 11 ing a primarily integrative function. 
In terms of this position the values of a particular society are 
pub! icly upheld and enforced through legislation, and this process 
thereby provides important behavioural references for the individual 
members of that society, and enhances solidarity. This process 
is considered to be functionally imperative for the system. 
Some deviant behaviour is always, nevertheless, to be expected 
and must be catered for by the system. It is when such behaviour 
transgresses legislative I imits, however, that it is construed 
as a threat to the system, and the legislature acts to curb it. 
Sometimes it reaches further, and acts to curb the possession of 
objects which may from time to time assist in the committal of a 
criminal act, on the assumption that such action is consistent 
with the defined social role of legislation, and it is in this 
context that firearms in modern industrial societies are of 
immediate relevance. 
While the problem of firearms control laws has been recognised 
and much pub! icised of late by the mass media in contemporary 
societies, particularly in the U.S.A. and Britain, it nevertheless 
remains I ittle understood, and even less the subject of sound 
scientific inquiry. Academics appear to have al I but ignored it. 
Lementably few relevant references are avai I able as a result of 
this neglect, and as far as the author is aware this project 
represents the first attempt to analyse the role of gun controls 
in South Africa in an objective manner. 
The perspectives which are popularly operative on the subject may, 
for purposes of introduction, perhaps be summarised as fol lows: the 
proponents of strict gun control laws, and/or of total confiscation 
of al I privately owned firearms point to rising homicide rates and 
crimes of violence committed with guns to justify their position. 
The opponents of gun controls, on the other hand, argue that where 
such laws have been enacted they have served to defeat the purposes 
for which they were designed rather than to promote them, and often 
use the alleged failure of the 191 I Sul I ivan Act of New York to 
demonstrate their point. Their argument is summarised in the oft-
quoted claim that ''when guns are outlawed, only the outlaws wi I I 
have guns'', and they accuse their opponents of gross overs imp I if ication. 
In South Africa guns have not been outlawed at the private citizen 
level, but they are nevertheless subject to relatively strict 
control by the polity. Any member of this society, regardless of 
racial considerations, may legally be possessed of firearms if he 
is prepared to accept the bureaucratic procedures which his I icence 
applications inevitably involve. These procedures place a time-
consuming burden not only on the applicant, but also on the pol ice, 
and perhaps more so. Why? What is the purpose of such I icensing 
requirements, and to what extent do they play their defined role? 
.. 
We assume a theoretical position In this study in terms 
of which gun contra I I aws are, in the f i na I ana I ys is, enacted to 
reduce deviant behaviour and enhance social solidarity. How does 
this assumption fit the empirical reality of the role of gun 
controls in South Africa? Can we say that the presence of such 
restrictions bears any signiticant relation to the factors which 
adversely affect the functional integration of our society? 
With reference to the perspectives outlined above an affirmative 
response to the latter question would reveal a supportive orientation 
relative to firearms legislation, no doubt in the belief that 
criminals and others who threaten the good order of society are 
thereby denied access to guns. The opposing perspective, 
on the other hand, is often represented by those who argue that 
such legislation serves simply to disarm the law-abiding, while 
the lawless remain armed. Simultaneously, as with al I artifacts 
of culture, guns mean different things to different people throughout 
the numerous subcultures which characterise contemporary industrial 
societies. We cannot assume that a gun means the same thing to 
a bank-robber and a competitive target-shooter alike, and therefore 
the polity should not legislate as if they do. 
The role of firearms in crime in South African society remains a 
somewhat unchartered field of inquiry, and the fragmented reports 
of daily newspapers and other periodicals serve to I ittle more 
than confuse their readers. For example, we read in an article 
on er i me 1i n the Cape Pen i nsu I a, headed "City Ki I I ers Worse Than 
N.Y. 11 <The Argus; Cape Town; March 24, 1973; P.9) that "guns 
are used very rarely - a fact attributed to South Africa's strict 
laws on firearms". The Cape Times of March 10th, 1973, however 
reports that a Par I iamentary cal I for action against crime had 
been made the previous day by Mr. J.Stephens, M.P. Mr Stephens 
is quoted as saying that the Cape of Good Hope had become the Cape 
of Fear. He said that youth gangs, growing in numbers, roamed 
the streets and terrorized residents in the townships. "In spite 
of the I icensing laws, these gangs sti I I managed to obtain firearms" 
he complained, and concluded by making a concerted cal I for a study 
to be mado in order that an indication could be obtained as to 
where the problem lay. 
The Argus of March 24, 1973, mentioned above, also quotes 
the Commissioner of the South African Pol ice, General Gidean Joubert, 
as stating that the pol ice took a serious view of the high crime 
rate (particularly as it is relatively higher than New York's), and 
had special plans to combat it. "The ideal situation", the General 
is reported to have said, " would be for everyone to be housed in 
properly planned townships with effective fa9i I ities for recreation 
and relaxation. In such townships the youth would be able to make 
good use of their energy, instead of wandering aimlessly in the 
streets. The pub I ic should also become more crime-conscious and 
inform the pol ice immediately of any crime in their vicinity". 
A number of intriguing points spring immediately to mind on 
I ook i ng at these extracts. First I y, South A fr i ca, and espec i a I I y 
Cape Town and surrounding areas, very clearly has a crime problem. 
Secondly, firearms do not feature significantly in the crime 
statistics, and it is therefore assumed that the strict firear·ms 
control laws in operation in our society are doing a fine job. 
Thirdly, that in spite of these laws gangs of lawless youths 
obtain guns, thereby demonstrating that the gun controls are 
ineffective. Fourthly, the ideal situation described by General 
Joubert apparently does not include provision for strict firearms 
control. If we disregard assumptions on the grounds that they 
are of a lower level of scientific acceptabi I ity, we are confronted 
by two reported facts. One is that firearms enjoy I imited criminal 
involvement, and the other is that the laws which should restrict 
ownership of guns to only approved individuals are quite unsuccessful. 
If this is the case, then what role,we may ask, does restrictive 
firearms legislation play in South Africa? 
In the attempt to answer this question, no claim to have exhausted 
the topic is made. On the contrary, it is accepted from the 
outset that this study is superficial and inadequate in terms of 
providing "final" answers, and that at best it can merely scratch 
the top of an enormous iceberg. In any case, answers in science 
are seldom final in the I iteral meaning of the word, and if this 
investigation is productive of no more than new questions, rather 
than answers to old ones, much wil I stil I have been achieved. 
Treatment of the problem has for convenience been divided into 
four Parts. In Part I the theoretical and methodological frameworks 
to be employed, (thereby if only by imp I ication stating the 
accompanying presuppositions) are discussed on a relatively high 
level of generality, before focusing on the specif le concept of 
legislation and defining its role in society. In Part I I the 
historical, contemporary, and South African legislative provisions 
with regard to firearms, and diverse popular perspectives already 
briefly introduced above are discussed in some detai I in order to 
build a foundation upon which our analysis of the problem may be 
, 
more informed and correspondingly meaningful. In Part I I I the 
problem is tackled in terms of avai I able empirical evidence, and 
the imp I !cations of the results are dealt with together with 
alternatives, the findings, general conclusions and suggestions 
in Part IV. 
The reader is encouraged to approach this research in the spirit 
in which it is offered, and on the accompanying level, and if the 
results are found to be controversial, cha I lenging, reactionary, 
enlightened, or simply right or wrong, or whatever, it is nevertheless 
hoped that it wi I I serve in some smal I way to stimulate serious 
thought and pub I le debate on the issue investigated. 
P A R T 
CHAPTER 
STATEMENT OF AN APPROACH 
The social scientist faces an immediate problem in his attempt 
to study a particular issue in a "sociological" way, for the 
body of I iterature referred to as sociological is vast indeed, 
and the alternatives of orientation which it offers both numerous 
and diverse. It is important, therefore, if not essential, that 
the researcher have some knowledge of these alternatives and their 
diversity to enable him to identify his own position based on criteria 
which he considers appropriate. Acquaintance with the content of 
these dive\se offerings permits him to decide for himself what are 
the most suitable uses to which each may be put, so that he may 
make a useful selection when it comes to focusing on specific 
and concrete issues for the purposes of empirical research . 
• 
It wil I be the aim of this opening Chapter to make explicit 
the methodological and theoretical assumptions underlying this 
investigation together with the resulting approach to be employed. 
No attempt wi I I be made to argue the val ldity of this approach, 
for three reasons: firstly, there exists no standard universally 
accepted set of criteria in terms of which theoretical and 
methodologrcal orientations may be measured against one another 
for the purposes of selection; secondly, any attempt to deal 
adequately with such a topic would require a treatise of encyclopaedic 
proportions far beyond the scope of this thesis; and thirdly, 
it wou Id raise prob I ems for which there are no ready so I ut.i ons and 
arguments about alternatives have I ittl~ or no direct relevance 
to the problem under investigation. 
This is not to say that such problems may be justifiably ignored, 
nor that the sele~tion of an appropriate orientation is necessarily 
arbitrary. The development of one's own the0retical and methodological 
position in the social sciences may be quite predictably an extremely 
difficult task, but it is nevertheless a critical one. 
_J 
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One's personal ideas on the requirements of sociological knowledge, 
research methods and theory-building are (or at least should be) 
open to so many conf I icting ideas and influences, trends and 
intellectual fashions, that it is not easy to organise them al I 
into a coherent set of interrelated propositions that one could 
cal I a theory, or even an approach. Being almost daily exposed 
to new insights forces one to continua I I y shift a 11 eg i ance, so to 
speak, or at least to critically examine one's own ideas, ~ssumptions, 
convictions etc., to the extent that a lot of hard thinking and 
intellectual soul-searching is required. 
What can make the exercise at first a I ittle unsettling is, after 
being conditioned to treating the ideas of others very critically, 
to suddenly find one's own efforts subjected to similarly unfriendly 
treatment. This is a problem which concerns particularly those of 
us who are sti I I learning what others have had to say about the 
nature and purposes of sociology and social research, and have not 
(perhaps yet) become flag-waving members of any particular sect 
along the discipline's theoretical continuum. 
The resulting hesitance to take a firm stand ought not to be 
altogether unsatisfactory, even to radical sociologists who demand 
commitment. One can hardly test the diverse orientations we have 
completely fairly unless we are prepared to al low each of them our 
open, earnest and objective attention. They have the right, each 
of them, to state their case in free scientific competition with 
others. 
In making some remarks on the teaching of sociology, Archibald 
(1971) (I) said, "We should attempt, firstly to induce insecurity 
by pul I ing the cognitive carpet from beneath the individual - to 
drive deep the furrows on undergraduate brows and to agree heartily 
I. Archibald, Drew Two Aspects of Chang.e 
2nd Congress of Sociology in S.A., 1971 
. : 
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with the complaint that this seems to be a f Teld where nothing is 
cut and dried. To inculcate the habit of mentally placing qu~tation 
marks over every assertion." 
It is difficult to understand how therefore, anyone who confronts 
the massive body of writings sociological with an "open" mind can 
possibly be a dogmatic loyalist of any particular school of 
thought. He may have his reasonec;I preferences, but somehow 
dogmatism seems inconsistent with the spirit of scientific enquiry. 
However much far-left "sociologists" may get behind and push the 
Marxist notion that rt is preferable to change the world than to 
know it, there are those of us who, whether as a result of our 
middle-class conservative backgrounds and accompanying domain 
assumptions or not, would prefer to have some knowledge of what 
it is we are helping to change and what consequences our actions 
wi I I have for the system as a whole. 
To take such a position does not necessarily define one as a 
reactionary, nor in any way resistant to ~hange, but it assists 
rather in helping one to view social change as serving a reasonably 
predictable end, rather than as an end in itself. 
Accepting, then, that on logical grounds it is impossible to begjn 
any discussion without at least some presuppositions, it would be 
wel I for us to fol low C.W. Mil Is (2) in agreeing that they ought 
at least to be made exp I iclt. To the extent to which we are aware 
of them they should be stated so as to encourage criticism on as. 
many levels as deemed useful, for if we cannot invite criticism 
we are uni ikely to contribute anything cf value to the advancement 
of knowledge. 
SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSID~RATIONS 
We assume from the outset that it is val id to talk of sociology 
as a scientific disciple if by science we mean or lay emphasis 
upon the method used to collect and arrange 9ate, empirical or 
2. Mi I ls, C.W. The Sociological Imagination 
Pel loan, G.B., 1970 
. 18. 
abstract, rather than th~ subject matter of the inquiry. This in 
itself does not necessarily mean that we have to model ourselves 
on the detailed experimental procedures of natural scientists and 
go about observing and mixing properties of social variables in 
test tubes, nor do we by definition become extreme empiricists 
or operationists, but rather we confine ourselves to within the 
boundaries al lowed by the philosophy of science in proad terms 
when conducting our investigations and expounding our theories, 
i.e., the processes of observation, analysis, and verification. 
Most of the popular approaches in sociological theory claim the 
use of the scientific method, although this method can be, and 
is used in different ways. Some, such as Parsonian structural -
functional ism and Marxist historical material ism are clearly best 
suited to the study of the universaf~ of .social behaviour. Their 
high level of f!eneral ity may create problem~ when attempting_ to 
explain particular socio-historical events in detail. ·Th~ fact 
that each has what Mclei'h (3) has cal led ''its own particular 
escape cl~uses" which off~r special explanations of why particular 
events do not seem to conform to the general model is a popular 
criticism offered by empiricists, among others. Empiricists, as 
opposed to Marxists for example, elect to prpceed from the speciflc 
to the general, rather than vice versa, y~t scientific status as 
claimed for both procedures. 
The claim for scientific status, however, f9rces us to face 
squarely what is one of the most fundamental questions in social 
science, and which is at th.e same ti me perhaps one of the most 
overworked problems researchers are cal led upon to face. Given 
that the subject matter of al I the social sciences is not 
inanimate things, but people who are in some control of their 
own behaviour, is it possible to talk about a science at al I in 
the sense in which the term is normally used? 
3. Mcleish, J. The The0ry of Social Change 
, I " I 
Rout I edge and Kagan Pi:JU I, London; 1969 
19. 
The confounding factor Is that whereas natural scientists 
present us with a series of events {e.g. as Darwin did), 
society presents social researchers ~ith a series of acts.· 
These acts are not only events, but they include Weber's famous 
notion of "verstehen" (4): i.e., the att has some symbolic meaning 
to its author both of which(actor and meaning) may change through 
the simple exertise of vol it ion. 
Such a complex problem as this, having exercised the minds of 
philosophers for centuries and involving, as it does, basic 
logical and epistemological problems of m~thodology in social 
science predictably has almost as many variations of responses 
to it as it has thinkers confronting it. Runciman (5) while he 
recognises this, nevertheless feels justified in simplifying 
the Issue by grduping al I these varibus responses under two 
headings, i.e., individualists on the one hand, and hol ists on 
the other. Tho~e who subscribe to variations of the former 
position maintain that any statement about a collectivity must 
be in principle reducible to a set ~f statements about the 
individuals which compri'se that collectivity. They point to 
what they cal I the "fallacy of re if ication" by accusing hol ists 
of treating groups of people as if they were tangible objects 
with irreducible properties. 
Without becoming involved in a protracted argument with regard 
to the pto's and cons of both these positions we opt here for 
the hol ist stance. The accusations df the individualists we 
circumvent (it WQLlld be pretentious tb claim to defeat them 
to the sat1sfactiori of al I interested parties ) by fol lowing 
the cybernetlcists and treating al I collectivities as systems 
which are operationally defined not as things or individuals, 
but as sets of ~ariables, C in our case, acts and roles). While 
we agree that it is a mistake to talk of groups of people having 
4. "Th~, Theory of. Socia I and Economic Organ i zat i on 11 P. 88 
In. Weber, M. Wirtschaft und Gesel lschaft 
5. Runciman, W.G. "Social_ Science and Political Theory" 
Cambridge University Press; 1969; P.6 
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ideas and other such things that can only be properly predicated 
of individuals, we nevertheless argue that the social system 
consists of something more than the sum of its parts. 
The propositions about col lectlvitles which fol low from this 
position we treat as meaningful it they can be tested and either 
validated or falsif led with reference to objective scientific 
criteria. This is eventually the most Important issue in the 
argument between individualists and ho! ists, and it applies equally 
to both. No proposition can be accepted or rejected simply on 
the grounds of the camp to which it belongs in the argument. It 
has to be tested and shown to be falsifiable, using a common unit 
of measurement. 
Although this approach falls within the hol ist tradition it is 
methodologically committed to logical empiricism because we accept 
that the objective criteria used as units of measurement for 
testing propositions about collectivities are scientific, i.e., 
the same as those used for testing propositions about things. 
Even where specific techniques may differ the underlying rationale 
and points of departure agree In principle, and we are required to 
treat the social sciences as methodologically equivalent to the 
natural sciences, and consider possible differences to be of a 
purely technical kind. (see for eg.Naegele, Hempel etc.) 
In searching for general explanations about social processes 
we might not be prepared to attribute the same degree of probability 
to them as natural scientists would with reference to their 
explanations about natural processes, but we nevertheless adopt 
the general aims of science together with these methodological 
approaches. In other words, having general explanations as the 
fundamental aim, we are led to the further aims of prediction and 
control (the moral imp I !cations of which we are wel I aware). 
We are aware also of, and prepared to credit, the objections of 
intuitionists that social behaviour takes place not in vacuo, 
2 I. 
but in a particular situation in time and space, and that it is 
al I very wel I to talk glibly of general ~xplanatory propositions 
about social processes which are so carefully formulated as to 
ensure potential empirical falsifiability, when in order for this 
to be val id it must always be possible for others to rep I ic9te the 
experimental situation, and how qoes one do this with a particular 
segment of history? Hi?torlcal events are unique in a wa~ that 
precludes any serious possibility of replication. For the 
purposes of analysis, however, we accept that although every 
historical event is unique, we are not thereby denied the validity 
of general explanations of the c9use-and-effect kind in terms ~f 
system variables. 
We should by now have learned that the history of science gives 
adequate testimony to the futi I ity of warring factions defining 
each other out of the field in terms of pre-selecteq and qften 
undeclared a priori assumptions. As Runcjman (6) says, 11 the only 
safe prediction to make about a branch of knowledge is that it ls 
bound to change one way or the other, and probably in a direction 
that few of its practitioners at any given time would suspect". 
He cites as an example that when Boyle of Soyle's Law fame was 
working on gases, plenty of people were ready to tel I him ( on 
good a priori grounds) that he was wasting his time. How, after 
al I, could anybody weigh air? 
The history of science demonstrates vividly that yesterday's 
"scientific laws" are refuted todciy, and it would be defeating 
the spirit of scientific inquiry to hold that today's "scientlf ic 
I aws" w i I I not be refuted tomorrow. Phil isophers and scientists 
before Copernicus, for instance, coulq show quite Gonclusiv~ly 
on the basis empirically observable evidence that the sun was In 
orbit around the earth. Today the converse is accepted, also 
on the basis of empirically observable evidence. ·Techniques of 
inquiry have become more sophisticated and refined through 
the centuries, and the continued methodological self-critlsm 
that scientists and especially social scientists engage Jn is 
22. 
itself encouraging, if only because it sets the stage for the 
further refinement of these techniques. The results we believe, 
wi I I be the accumulation of more knowledge, hitherto hidden 
from us, or misinterpreted by us. 
We adopt an analytical approach in this study in the belief 
that it is I ikely to be more productive in terms of the problem 
to be investigated. We start out with a conceptual scheme which 
is duly stated and invite criticism on this level, and then attempt 
to operationalize the constructs thus isolated and identified. 
We prefer to operationally define these constructs first before 
choosing suitable data producing techniques. 
In our attempt to determine the role played by firearms control 
laws in South Africa we have I ittle choice other than to employ 
documentary research techniques in order to gather the data 
required. The information needed includes that relevant to the 
historical development of these laws in terms of actual content 
as wel I as effect before the contemporary situation can be adequately 
understood. This task requires that we restrict ourselves to 
official records, such as Statutes, continuous reports of the 
Department of Statistics, and annual reports of the Commissioner 
of the South African Pol ice. Careful selection, classification, 
and tabulation of this data wi I I, we believe, give us grounds upon 
which we may deduce objectively the role of the various laws 
restricting the possession and use of firearms in our society. 
The value of such official documentary research is that its 
rel iabi I ity is far greater than if personal documents were used. 
Autobiographies, diaries, letters and inventories, for example, 
may provide excel lent data for certain types of research studies (7), 
but are clearly not as wel I suited to the investigation as the 
impersonal, official records provided, for instance, by the 
Government Printer. Besides this, also is the further point that 
the problems of sample size and selection do not arise because 
7. Burton, T.L. & Cherry, G.E. Social Research Techniques for Planners 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London 1970;p.p.123-126 
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the statistical information contained in records of the Department 
of Statistics are for the whole society, and not just a micro-
section of it. This, we believe, wi I I provide the most effective 
means of meeting the objective requirements we have set for the· 
basis of the observation and analysis of the problem we intend 
to study. 
A GENERAL THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
lmpl icitly running through the preceding discussion of methodological 
considerations has been the definition of sociology and sociological 
knowledge as being an attempt to provide general explanations in 
terms of scientific causality. In order to satisfy this definition 
we therefore require, at the theoretical level, a framework consisting 
of a set of general testable, explanatory propositions applicable 
to the total area of collective human behaviour, or social action. 
By definition, then, we have at this level to deny the sharp 
disciplinary distinctions sometimes drawn between economics, 
criminology, sociology, and demography, etc., and while accepting 
that the increasing academic division of labour has provided more 
and more differentiated foci of study, we consider the names 
attached to them as applying to certain categories of action, al I 
of which is in the final analysis social. 
The general theoretical framework is required because it is the 
critical factor in terms of the analytical approach which eventually 
gives significance to the meaning of empirical results. Facts 
cannot speak for themselves; they need to be situated within the 
provisions of a general theory before they can claim any degree 
of universal applicability. Research evidence is by nature 
fragmented, and therefore in order to be of real scientific value 
it requires generalization. 
As with our methodological procedures, however, the theoretical 
orientation adopted must satisfy the requirements of science. 
While we require generality we also require empirical falsifiability 
as one of its essential distinguishing characteristics. It cannot 
be so general and so flexible that it can never be shown to be 
invalid, and in this context we do not need a verbose description, 
nor merely an abstract general discussion of the possible connections 
between variables, for neither can make adequate provision for the 
demonstration of scientific causality. 
As has already been stressed, there exists a wide variety of 
theoretical orientations in the I iterature of sociology of which 
we are aware and which may serve as frameworks for empirical 
research. It is not intended here to lay bare the characteristics 
and popular criticisms of them al I. Suffice it to say that 
structural-functional ism, as one mode of Parsonian analysis, is 
to be employed as the general theoretical position for this study. 
We are not denying that a strong case may be made for some or al I 
such orientations as empiricism, ethnomethology, symbolic interactionism~ 
"far-leftism", radical sociology, middle-range theorizing, and 
particularly for Marxist historical material ism in that it conforms 
to what C.W. Mil Is (8) has cal led "Grand Theory". Such a discussion 
may wel I serve as the subject-matter for numerous theses on sociological 
theory without shedding I ight on the problem to be dealt with here. 
The structural-functional mode of analysis has been pioneered largely 
by Talcott Parsons (9) and provides the basis for contemporary 
"establishment sociology". A more detailed discussion of this 
position together with its application to the field of legislation 
is presented in the fol lowing chapter. 
8. C.W. Mi I ls 
9. T.Parsons 
The Sociological Imagination 
Pelican, G.B. 1970 
The Structure of Social Action 
Free Press; N. Y. 1937 
CHAPTER 2 
SOCIOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION 
Our task requires that we now move on to a discussion and 
application of the selected theoretical orientation and 
methodological principles to the more specific area of interest 
with which i·h is study is concerned, i • e. , soc i a I I eg is I at ion. 
From the point of view of general sociology, this field fal Is 
into that branch of sociology referred to as the sociology of 
law; one of the many analytical distinctions which abound 
in contemporary social science and, as we have mentioned, cal led 
for by the increasing academic division of labour. 
What distinguishes the sociology of law from other branches, 
particularly the closely related field of criminology within 
the discipline is simply its subject matter. As we have 
mentioned before, these distinctions and divisions into branches 
are not real, but merely analytical, and therefore any attempt 
to draw dogmatic or even clear boundaries around these sub-
divisions would be a perfectly fruitless exercise. It is far 
more important for the sociologist of law, for instance, to be 
able to compare and contrast his role with that of the jurist, 
or student of doctr i na I I aw, for perhaps the most er it i ca I 
function of the sociology of law is to assist in enhancing the 
legal profession's awareness of its own function in society, as 
wel I as helping legislators, and even the courts in making 
decisions. 
The dramatic rise in both the volume and qua I ity of sociological 
knowledge since the turn of the twentieth century has led to 
radical changes in legal thinking and practice. The popularisation 
of the concept of rehab ii itation of criminals and the planning and 
implementation of policies designed to actualise this concept is 
but one example. The fact that most of the optimism accompanying 
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rehabilitative policies has had good reason to whither away 
has not, it appears, in the least affected the influential role 
played by sociological knowledge in the legal sphere, perhaps 
because it is sociologists themselves who are keeping legislators 
and I ega I practitioners in formed that these po I ic i es are st i I I in 
a somewhat primitive stage and leave much to be desired. 
Sociologists are apparently maintaining their influence. 
The sociology of law enjoys one significant advantage over the 
study of doctrinal law, and that is that the former can stand 
aside from the legal process and its relation to social norms 
and observe with an objectivity which can hardly be expected 
from the latter, which is more con~erned with providing judges 
and lawyers with the necessary tools they need in order to make 
far-reaching decisions on a 'wide variety of problems, often required 
within a very I imited period of time. This basic difference is, 
of course, rooted in the different social functions of law and 
sociology. 
What strikes the sociologist almost immediately he chooses to study 
law is the similarity of concepts and terminology employed to convey 
them. Many central concepts which are popularly used in the 
theoretical I iterature of sociology have obvious reference to the 
field of law; such as authority, legitimation, norms, conformity, 
deviance, sanction, etc. Nevertheless, however closely related, 
the concept of social legislation is not synonomous with any of 
these. In its own way it i nvo Ives them a I I, but yet has other 
distinct properties. 
vJi th reference once again to our genera I theoret ica I framework, 
we assume that the values of society are pursued through the 
establishment of patterns of behaviour regarded as normative. 
The members of society learn via the process of socialization 
(amongst others) the rules which state what human beings should 
say, think or do in any given situation. These rules also imply 
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the notion of sanction in the sense that failure to conform to 
the norms, or to display exp I icitly proscribed behaviour, is 
I ikely to lead to some form of punishment meted out by the group. 
The system of values which characterises any one society is 
taken as the essential starting point because it is necessarily 
formulated at a very high level of generality (10) necessarily 
because we can only identify and classify our problem areas with 
reference to a general categorisation of the structural components 
of social systems. 
At the most general level, then, we are concerned with the 
ways in which values are shared by the actors in the system 
internalised so as to make behaviour reasonably predictable, 
and .inst i tut i ona I i sed in the soc i a I structure. Proceeding 
from here to a more differentiated level of analysis we. look 
at the ways in which these values are involved with the more 
specific structures through the institutions, which act as 
regulating mechanisms. The third level to which the analysis 
leads us concerns the organization for implementation of action 
towards collective goals, i.e., the political aspects of social 
organization. 
The values define for the individual actor (and hence the 
institutions and collectivities in the system) the broad 
directions of orientation regardless of content or situation. 
Institutions, on the other hand, are normative patterns which 
define categories of expected behaviour. Collectivities, here 
the most highly differentiated level of analysis, involve 
existing groups (of actors in roles) engaged in functionally 
significant activities for the system. 
10. Parsons, T. Structure and Process in Modern Societies 
Free Press, 111 inois, 1960 P.171 
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Analysis along these I ines leads Parsons to define law as 
"that aspect of the machinery for the definition and implementation 
of institutional norms which I inks legitimation through authoritative 
interpretation with application and enforcement by political agency" 
( I I ) .. 
Laws, J ike the value systems which are their source, do not 
actualise themselves automatically, but succeed (to a greater 
or lesser extent) in influencing the behaviour of actors through 
an array of mechanisms, such as institutionalization, socialization, 
peer-group influence, informal pressures, etc. 
ft is critical for the development of our concept of social 
legislation that we carefully consider Parsons' distinction 
between political and legal processes in the system, for it 
is al I too easy to confuse them. The latter, i.e., the legal 
process, defines the scope of jurisdiction and authorises and 
implements sanctions, and although these obviously involve 
political references, it is the acts of actually making laws and 
enforcing them that are especially pof iticaf. What is important 
to note here is that legislators and law enforcement agencies 
are not,strictfy speaking, a part of the legal system, but are 
a part of the function of the pol icy. 
This distinction drives deeper for us the wedge between the 
sociology of law and the study of doctrinal Jaw. The latter 
must by definition remain within the bounds of the fegaf system, 
whereas the former has a broader, more inclusive sphere of inquiry. 
In contemporary societies functional differentation has progressed 
to relatively high levels, and hence some kind of legal ( or 
constitutional) I imit on pof iticaf authority has become imperative. 
Ever since Jeremy Bentham there has been a strong movement towards 
a very clear separation of the legal system from the executive. 
Habeas corpus is today considered a fundamental right of the 
individual - being deemed a necessary mechanism for I imiting 
governmental oppression of the individual by unjust manipulation 
and application of the laws. 
I I • I b i d I p. I 90 
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This increasing functional differentatfon has led to the development 
of new and more specialised structures, each with its own terms of 
reference and sphere of authority (legitimized by -the general values), 
fitting the rational-legal bureaucratic model ever more pleasingly. 
The emergence, growth and further differentiation of such structures 
is essential for the continued development of the social systems 
in which actors in modern industrialized states operate. 
Returning to the above definition of law we need to note that 
between the institutional and collectivity levels a further process 
of differentation occurs which is of central importance to our 
developing concept of social legislation. The imp I ication of this 
is that while institutionalised categories of behaviour are actively 
promoted by specific collectivities in the system, not al I norms 
can be defined as laws. 
Fol lowing Sorokin (12) for instance, we may distinguish between 
different types or categories of norms in order to determine which 
are of relevance to our purpose. Sorokin categorises norms into 
the fol lowing: law, moral, technical, etiquette and fashion, 
religion, mores, folkways and customs.· This tel Is us more than 
simply that al I norms are not laws. It tel Is us that they can 
be exclusively defined. Law-norms, for example, are quite 
distinct from others in the sense that they are attributive. 
They lay down the rights of one person, and at the same time 
lay down the duties of another, including sanctions. Law norms 
are, therefore, two-sided or Janus-headed. Without this attributive 
function of law-norms social organization would supposedly break 
down into some sort of Hobbesion "state of nature". Another 
characteristic is that they require some authority which is a 
direct manifestation of these law-norms and is capable of 
enforcing them (in other words, Parsons' "political agency"), 
with reasonably equal intensity and success on al I members of 
a group, irrespective of rank. 
Moral norms, on the other hand, are not two-sided. 
12. Sorokin, P.A. Society, Culture & Personality 




Imperative but not attributive. For example, sometimes the 
law norms wll I allow a third party to settle a debt, but this is 
Impossible with respect to moral norms. No punishment Is 
necessarily specified, nor ls any I lmlt laid down. 
Technical norms tel I the actor the "correct way" for him to 
behave towards inanimate objects, such as how to build a molotov 
cocktal I, or how to fry mushrooms. They are not usually imperative. 
Norms of etiquette and fashion, however, carry their own sanction, 
but no-one can demand that the individual subscribe to these norms 
because there Is no governing or ruling body to enforce them. 
This ls true even of societies such as that of present-day Malawi., 
where It Is an offence for young ladles to wear mini-skirts. 
What has happened here Is that this particular norm of fashion 
has been translated Into a law-norm, leavlng other norms of 
fashion to continue In the role of Informal pressure mechanisms 
ppplylng their own sanctions In cases of deviance. 
Norms of rel lglon, mores, and folkways are also not enforced 
In mo~t societies. Thay mean different things to different sub-
9reup5 and sub-cultures In the society. Some are partly moral, 
but they stll I usually refer to those values which are of lower 
statua, or to which the group grants secondary priority. 
It 15 the law~norms, then, that are of more direct relevance to 
this exercise than the other categories. But law-norms themselves 
do not conetltuta soclal leglslatlon. The central concepts which 
I Ink the two are those of power and communication. The former 
refers tc the capacity of a society's rulers to force Individual 
membern to conform to the I aw·· norms accord Ing to a stab 11 I sed 
code. The latter refers to the capacity of the rulers to Inform 
members of the group of the content of the law norms and of 
the ccncomltant sanctions. This Is essential for tho system to be 
at al I viable, because the pol lty Is then Justlf led· In trying to 
apply the laws uni versa I ly and consistently on the grounds that 
lgnor~nce thereof Is no excuse. 
Legislation consists therefore of those law norms which have been 
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stabilized into an attributive code and are communicated to the 
members of society by the polity and are enforced by it. 
The study of criminology, we may then conclude, as far as it is 
relevant to the investigation, is simply an arbitrary sub-division 
of sociology which has as its subject matter the behaviour related 
to deviance from the legislative code. The general framework 
and variables studied do not differ from those of sociology at al I, 
but are merely focused onto a smaller, more selective field. 
Al I human societies have some form of social legislation in the 
same way that the five institutions (the family, the economy, 
education, religion, and the polity) are common to al I human 
societies, regardless of historical or geographical considerations. 
These effect only the form which the institutions may take, not 
thei~ existence. 
It requires I ittle searching in the theoretical I iterative 
to find a model to demonstrate how social legislation differs 
in both purpose and form in different social groupings through 
space and time. Using Weber's famous model, for example, it is 
quite clear that legislation affecting societies ruled by a 
traditional leader can differ very markedly from that affecting 
societies ruled by charismatic and rational-legal bureaucratic 
leaders. Different priority is attached to the variables which 
are used as reference points in political decision-making. 
The latter, the rational-legal bureaucratic form of government 
is the most popular by far in modern industrialised societies 
simply because it is found to be the most efficient, consistent, 
and reliable (i.e., it best serves the values of these societies). 
Its essential characteristics are those of achievement rather 
than ascription, subordination of al I ranks to an independent 
(i.e., of the executive), impersonal rule of law and procedural 
regulations rather than to the erratic wishes and whims of a 
traditional despot, power and authority diffused through roles 
located in scaled ranks in the system in other words a somewhat 
sophisticated division of labour) and decentralized authority 
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as opposed to being centralised In the hands of one person, 
and the existence of laws - in theory at least - designed to 
protect the poor and the weak from exploitation rather than to 
protect the interests of the already powerful. This ensures 
that the rewards and facilities of society are distributed 
amongst its members more justly ( or so we believe). 
Such a system has its roots in the philosophical tradition of 
the West. Although, as Parsons (13) notes, the legal element 
was central in the Chinese development it took a form which did 
not readily become differentiated from either the political or 
the religious - on the contrary, it formed the focus of a special 
kind of codification of the rel igio-pol itical fusion. There was 
therefore essentially no pattern of institutionalization of legal 
rights against the State or religion. 
The Greek legal system (from which ours is derived) was similar, 
except that the essential democratic element institutionalized 
individual rights to participate in decision making within the 
State. In Rome, whose political power grew while internally 
the democratic element declined in importance relations with the 
populations of the Empire became constructed in dual form: the 
privil iges of Roman citizenship were extended to more and more 
people throughout the Empire, and at the same time the jus 
gentium developed as a legal system applicable to al I under 
Roman administration. Roman law became completely independent 
from political authority in a unique sense, despite the fact 
that the polity administered and enforced the law and was 
supported in this by religious sanctions. Parsons therefore, 
quite justifiably sees Roman law together with classical culture, 
as constituting one of the most important legacies from antiquity 
to the modern Western world. In fact if anything, Parsons has 
understated his case. Perhaps this was the most important legacy. 
This was a legacy, however, which lay for centuries, forgotten 
unnoticed, during the so-cal led Dark Ages, to be revived when 
Bentham ( 14) pioneered political democracy. Bentham re-introduced 
13. Parsons, T. 
14. Bentham, J. 
Structure and Process in Modern Societies 
Free Press; 111 inois; 1960 
The Theory of Legislation 
Kegan Pau I ; London; 1931 
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the idea of a legal system completely independent of political 
authority, and held that each individual should be considered 
equal to every other before the law. This is of central 
importance to us today because it is largely with democratic 
(as opposed to despotic in Toby's sense Cl5))1egal systems 
that we dea I in contemP'orary societies. 
The politically democratic and capitalistic characters of many 
contemporary bureaucratic systems are, however, no guarantee 
of democracy (the Soviet Union is administratively highly 
bureaucratic, but could hardly be cal led democratic!) Of 
particular interest, for instance, is the contrast which Weber 
( 16) makes between khadi and empirical administration. 
The former is non-formalistic and is guided in accordance with 
concrete ethical or otherwise "practical" value-judgments, 
without any rational basis. As an example, contemporary England 
stil I exhibits a substantial section of its legal system as 
being essentially khadi, to an extent which would be difficult 
to visualise in other Western European countries. Democratic 
principles of adjudication, therefore, cannot be assumed to be 
identical with rational principles .. 
Empirical administration, on the other hand, while being highly 
formalistic, is carried out with reference to and with the 
interpretation of precedents. Now, while this form of administration 
can be sub I imated and rationalized into a highly refined technique, 
it does not have a rational basis in the strict sense of the word. 
Fortunately, however, the democratic concept of justice stands a 
better chance of successful implementation because in most 
"civi I ised" societies (including England) there.exist strong 
15. Toby, J. ContemEorart Societt 
John Wiley & Sons, N.Y. 1964 P.483-485 
16. Weber, M. Rational and Irrational Administration of Justice 
In Aubert, "V Sociolo9t of Law 
Penguin; England; 1969; 153 
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elements of both khadi and empirical approaches to law enforcement. 
Uni ike most of the other areas of administration, legal systems 
have successfully combatted the threat of total bureaucratization. 
The idea, as Weber (17) expresses it, of the modern judge "as a 
vending machine into which the pleadings are inserted together 
with the fee and which then disgorges the judgment together with 
its reasons mechanically derived from the code" has served to 
horrify administrators and legislators sufficiently enough to retard 
the complete rationalisation of legal systems. Legislators today 
tend to make a habit of keeping mandatory sentences to a minimum, 
and assisting judges to individualise each case and to exercise 
reasoned discretion. Upper and lower I imits are set on the 
sanctions which a judge may apply once a verdict has been reached 
so that not so much compassion as situational circumstances may 
be taken into account. 
We have perhaps now reached an appropriate stage in this discussion 
at which it may be of use to look a I ittle closer at the imp I ications 
of the point that legislation takes different forms and fulfi I Is 
different functions in different societies through space and time. 
Mankind has towards the last quarter of the twentieth century 
divided himself up into a number of social groupings, cal led states; 
and these states have the fol lowing general characteristics: they 
are groups of people who enjoy territorial integrity (and usually 
sovereignity), a degree of permanence, and a central hierarchy of 
authority, or a unified politico-legislative system to which al I 
members of the group are subject. To this short I ist of broad 
criteria political scientists, and sometimes sociologists, add 
the concept of "voluntary association". However, as contemporary 
history unfolds itself it becomes clear that many modern states 
do not consider the "voluntary association" of their members 
to be critical to their statehood. Witness, for example, the 
technically ingenious methods employed by the East German 
authorities to keep their "citizens" from escaping over the Berl in 
wal I. Miles and miles of minefields and self-triggering machine 
17. Ibid, P.159 
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guns pay a somewhat sorry tribute to the concept of "voluntary 
association". Notwithstanding this, West Germany has very 
recently officially recognised the existence of the State of 
East Germany. Likewise citizens of the Soviet Union who happen 
to adhere to the Jewish faith and who would prefer to voluntarily 
associate with Israel share problems similar to those of the 
unwil I ing on the wrong side of the Berl in wal I. As in the case 
of East Germany, the U.S.S.R. is considered no less. a state as 
a result of this. 
On the theoretical level as wel I there is a very fundamental 
lack of agreement between the structural-functionalist and 
historical-materialist notions with respect to the role of 
legislation. The former position sees legislation as an essentially 
cohesive force in society, whereas the latter view, true to the 
Marxist tradition, sees it as a bourgeois instrument which maintains, 
confirms, and legitimizes basic cleavages in society. (Cohesion 
and legitimation are not in terms of this formulation being posited 
as necessarily contradictory, for both can enjoy different types 
of empirical relationship). There is no Platonic form of justice 
to serve as a guiding principle and to which al I ranks are subject; 
on the contrary, it is a tool which is enforced in order to maintain 
the status quo, and which is subject to arbitrary change. 
The former view, that of legislation as a cohesive force, has 
enjoyed widespread popularity among sociologists of the mainstream 
tradition. Durkheim ( 18), for example, felt that since law 
reproduces the principle forms of social solidarity, one would 
only have to classify the different types of law in order to deduce 
the different types of social solidarity which correspond to them. 
Durkheim proceeded to divide law into repressive (i.e., penal) 
on the one hand, and restitutive (i.e., civil, commercial, 
procedural, administrative and constitutional law) on the other, 
and it is his treatment of restitutive law which is of particular 
interest to the student of contemporary sociological theory in 
18. Durkheim, E. The Division of Labour in Society 








the sense that he considers it analytically analagous to the 
nervous system in the organism because it has as its task, in effect, 
the regulation of the different functions of the body in such a 
way as to make them harmonize. This is, of course, remarkably 
similar to Parson's employment of Canon's theory of homeostasis 
to i 1 lustrate a similar point. Durkheim sees the nervous system 
as the expression of the state of concentration at which the 
organism has arrived in accordance with the divisions of physiological 
labour. In other words, we can measure the degree of concentration 
at which a society has arrived in accordance with its divisions of 
social labour according to the development of co-opsrative 
law with restitutive sanctions. 
Parson's treatment of this theme is both more elaborate and 
sophisticated. He suggests that the system is subject to 
four functional imperatives, which can be seen as crises which 
have to be successfully overcome if the system is to maintain 
itself. These are adaptation, goal pursuance, pattern maintenance, 
and integration. The responsibility for the resolution of these 
crises however, rests with the individuals who wield real power 
in society, and the extent which they are resolved, or otherwise, 
remains an empirical question. 
The adaptive imperative is normally identified with economic 
processes at the societal level (although Bredemeier ( 19) prefers 
to "broaden" the scope of adaptation to include science and 
technology, it is nevertheless felt that Parsons was using "economic" 
in its most general sense in this context - so general, that is, as 
to include science and technology in any case). In this sense the 
development of facilities for coping with the obstacles in the path 
of the achievement of system goals is economic. 
The actual pursuance of system goals is of course related to 
political processes. Legislators are faced with the task of 
interpreting the "general wil 111 of the people, formulating collective 
19. Bredemeier, H.C. "Law as an Integrative Mechanism" 
in Sociology of Law, Aubert, V.(ed) 








goals, and placing these interpretations and formulations on the 
statute books, In other words, the polity's primary input into 
the legal system is a description of the ideal state of affairs 
for which social resources are to be mobilised through the actual 
use of power. The result of this is the corresponding output of 
the legal system by applying general pol icy statements to the 
solution of specific conf I icts at hand - i.e., creative interpretation 
of what the legislature means by the abstract language it uses to 
describe the ideal state of affairs. 
At the political level there exists two contrasting views on the 
relationship between the law and the polity. According to the one, 
law is determined by the sense of justice and the moral sentiments 
of the population, and legislation can only achieve the results for 
which it is designed by staying relatively close to the prevai I ing 
social norms. According to the other, however, legislation is a 
vehicle through which a programmed social evolution can be brought 
about. The latter view was adopted, for instance, by Mao-Tse-Tung 
with respect to the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The massive 
programmes of social engineering being applied by the present 
government in South Africa in its attempt to develop ethnic 
homelands is another good example. The rationale underlying this 
approach would appear to be that if you force a change in behaviour 
a corresponding change in values wil I fol low once this change has 
become accepted as inevitable. 
The third functional imperative mentioned above, that of pattern 
maintenance, is served primarily through the socialization process. 
Through this process individual actors come to attach shared 
meanings to cultural symbols, and in this way the pattern of the 
system is generally maintained. To ii lustrate; if this imperative 
is applied to the legal system it becomes clear that in order to 
be effective as a venue for the resolution of conflicts, the courts 
have to sel I "justice" - a commodity about the definition of which 
there is general agreement. Justice is always culturally defined 
and therefore this high I ights the important role of socialization. 
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If the courts are not predictable, or ff they do not sel I Justice 
as it is conceived then conflicts wil I be resolved in other ways. 
The f inaf functional imperative, the problem of integretation,. 
is served essentially by the legal system itself. As mentioned 
above it puts a particularistic interpretation on universalistic 
pol icy statements that come down from the legislature and gives 
its own meaning to them. The most important integrative 
processes of the legal system are the resolution of conff icts in 
the courts in accordance with precedent and the stabilised code 
~ which enhances predictability, anq this reinforces social values 
\ by pub I icly upholding them. These provide important behavioural 
references for individuals, mQst particular!~ in heterogenous 
societies. 
ft is this fatter point, however, that of th~ rapidly increasing 
complexity and heterogenity of modern industrial societies that 
brings to the fore the critical importance of the legal system 
as an integrative mechanism. Jn such a ~onf4sing context the 
legal system walks a tight-rope in attempting to serve an 
integrative function, particularly when numerous cultural groups 
are subject to the same political authority. 
Mufti-cultural societies, however, are not the only form of 
social heterogenity. Even within t~e same culture there exists 
in developed societies such a diversity qt value orientations 
(which is itself becoming increasingly valued) among the members 
that it is often no lo~ger possible to guarantee conformity and 
equi I ibrium through traditional techniques. Wit~ the spreading 
of the democratic ideal and the widespread acceptan~e at the 
political level of individual freedom there has been such an 
increase in the scope of what is permitted behaviour, and norms 
have been subjected to such rapid change that there appears to 
have developed a trend towards using the written Jaw as the o~ly 




This of course goes very much further than simply stating that 
there exists always a dynamic ten?lon between actual behaviour 
and expected behaviour. To an increasing degree it would appear 
that the scope of the former has blossomed at the expense of the 
latter and expectations would appear now to stop at the written 
law only. This would indicate that there is a shifting away 
from the use of personal moral or religious norms in evaluating 
behaviour. Instead "anything goes" as I ong as it does not 
transgress in exp I icitly laid down and enforced rule of law. 
What distinguish~s social legislation is the fact that no 
matter how democratic the system is in which he operat~s, the 
individual is forced to conform, or else face formal (and often 
serious) sanction. He may hate a particular law, or set of laws, 
,he may curse them and campaign against them even on "mora I" or 
constitutional grounds, but he must obey them if he wishes to remain 
an active member of that society. Unfortunately it is but a ?hort 
step from hating and cursing certain laws to hating and cursing 
the people whom society has charged with the task of enforcing them, 
The important point here for a sociologist to remember is that this 
does not necessarily amount tp a confrontation with the legal 
system as an integrative proces?, but rather with the goal pursuance 
policies of the legislature. This is borne out by the fact that 
the polity can be and sometimqs is sued by individuals in a court 
of law. For as long as the possibility exists that a polity can 
lose such a case in a court of law the distinction between the 
polity and the legal system remains val Id. 
With reference to the Parsonian framework it is clear that some 
system of enforced legislation ts functionally imperative for 
the continued existence of a society in the modern ind4strial 
and technological age. The actual content of the legislation (or 
part of it) may threaten to tear the society apart (as legislation 
concerning the draft and the Vietnam War is reported to have 
threatened in the U,S.A.), and such content usually requires change 
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from time to time as structural strains occur resulting from a 
rapidly changing value system, but nevertheless no society can 
exist without some form of legislation. What often happens is 
that the legal system itself makes adjustments to social change 
without formal reference to the polity simply by al lowing some 
laws to fal I into disuse. 
The problem faced by legislators in attempting to gauge the 
collective wil I of their electorate is far more complex and 
their success more dubious than the classic democratic theorists 
would have us believe. There is a lot more to it than simply 
implementing a party political pol icy on the grounds that it 
represents a mandate from the peop I e. In fact much has been 
made (i.e., from Ostrogorski onwards (20)) of the charge 
that democrats tend to greatly overemphasize the intellectuality 
of mankind. Paul F. Lazarsfeld 1 s work (21) has shown very clearly 
that to assume that the mass of voters make their choices as a 
result of rational preferences from among the avai I able alternatives 
is naive to say the least. To take the issue further and to base 
one's behaviour on the assumption that al I the "important issues" 
in any one election are before the voters to roughly the same 
extent, and that the choice wi I I depend upon the voter's considered 
opinion of what is best for the society as a whole, is very 
wishful thinking indeed. As mankind experiences the continuing 
trend towards gr~ater urbanization and socio-cultural heterogeneity, 
so this problem wi I I increase in complexity and the more difficult 
it w i I I become for I eg is I ators to determine the "genera I w i I I" 
on even quite fundamental issues (assuming that they really want to). 
These democratic assumptions, however, irrespective of their 
lack of good fit with empirical reality, are critical for the 
continuation of the system which we value so highly. In terms of 
our values the system is the best avai I able from among the possible 
alternatives and the most I ikely to defend particularly human 
values. 
20. Runciman, W.G. Social· Science and Political Theory 
Cambridge; I 969 
21. Lazarsfeld, Paul F. The American Soldier 1949 
The People's Choice 1944 
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As mentioned above contemporary soci~ties have been, and are 
being subjected to rapid changes, and this is an essential area 
of focus for the sociologist of law, for social changes are never 
without their costs. The rigidity of the village society has 
disappeared and has made way for a more flexible social str~cture 
at the cost of social integration. Yet if social integration 
is the primary purpose of legislation, and if tho system we I ive 
in has any value for social researchers and they wish to see 
its survival and development in terms of our commitment to 
human values they wil I hqve to incre9singly address themselves 
to the problems of dee I ining integration and the role of sociology 
of I aw. 
Rising crime rates are one measure of dee I ining social integration 
and as sociologists ~e hardly need to be told that this has been 
a feature of the pos~ World War 11 era. The ~riminologlst who 
today cannot report sharp rises in the crime statistics is 
perhaps regarded with some suspicion~ so commonplace has the 
trend become. The mechanisms of social integration need to be 
kept firmly under the spotlight, and the sociolcigy of legislation, 
as one important aspect, deserves careful consideratiqn in terms 
of changing roles and functions. 
In the Republic of South Africa~ as one empirical example of 
the above theoretical discussion, one confronts a situation 
in which legislation is the product of a minority of the society 
in a unique sense. The white population group, comprising 
hardly one-fifth of the total population enjoys 4niversal adult 
suffrage and a reasqnably democratic pol it lea I existence. This 
system, however, is maintained by its simultaneous superimposed 
totalitarian rule of the black peoples within the country's borders. 
One would therefore expect to find, on theoretical grounds, 
that the legislation produced an9 enforced in this society, 
together with the ways in which official attempts are made to 
resolve the other functional imperatives, woul~ be quite clearly 
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designed to suit the white gr9up 9t the expense of the others. 
Laws, and in this context firearms GOntrol laws, which affect 
people of al I races and ~olours, are suggested, depated~ l9bbied, 
and finally passed by white legislators who are in the final 
analysis responsible only to a white elect9rate. The al 1$ged 
offender of the laws thus formulated is apprehends~ by a law-
enforcement officer who may be white or black and brought before 
a judge who wil I most I ikely be white, ~nd is then tried withqut 
reference to his colour. The fact that most law-breakers happen 
to be black is not itself, however, sufficient to demonstrate 
the proposition that the ~tiology of such cri~e I !es in the absence 
of blacks from the law-making machinery, for this is an empirical 
question. And so it Is with regard to gu~ GOntrol; it is the 
purpose of this study to try tq determine ~mpirically what role 




If any de jure political administration is to be successful 
in its goal-pursuance function then it requires that the 
necessary preconditions of government obtain in the society 
for which it legislates. Amongst these necessary preconditions 
are those which are often referred to as 11 I aw and order". In 
other words, whether a particular pol ltical hiararchy governs 
on the authority of its subjects or not, it cannot satisfactorily 
pursue its goals unless it enjoys de facto power with respect to 
the behaviour of its citizens, together with communication of 
that power, and some form of recognition of and co-operation 
with it. 
To have the capacity to exercise power in society a government 
must have at its disposal the use of force, and factors relatlng 
to it. No government can justifiably cal I itself by that name 
unless it has ultimate control of violence together with the 
facilities which make such violence possible. It is therefore 
clear thet the possession of instruments of violence, firearms 
In this tontext, by private citizens in the society, for whatever 
purposel is of great interest to those whose task it is to 
formula+~ pub I ic pol icy, and cannot but have some significant 
influence on it. As we would expect, different governments 
finding themselves in different social situations in space and 
time, and guided by various diverse ideological references, view 
the private ownership of weapons, particularly guns, with feelings 
ranging from abhorence at the one extreme to enthusiasm at the 
other. 
In this part we shal I look briefly at general historical and 
contemporary approaches of political administrations to the private 
possession of firearms, and then move on to discuss current South 
African legislative provisions in this regard. It is felt that 
it would be a fair theoretical assumption to make at the outset 
in this discussion that the closer a government maintains the 
legislation it adopts to that which is legitimized by the general 
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values of society, the more I lkely it Is to support in principle 
the private possession of firearms by its citizens Cal I other 
things, such as crime r~tes for example, being equal) for law-
abiding purposes. 
The imp I ications of this assumption are that the higher the 
degree of authority enjoyed by a particular administration, the 
less I ikely is that administration going to view such possession 
as threatening to the solidarity of society or the continued 
existence of the polity itself. On the contrary, citizens are 
more I ikely to identify with its goal-pursuance policies and it 
is perhaps desireable, as a result, that they be armed. On the 
other hand, if force alone is the emphasis of a government and 
constitutes its fundamental thrust, then the possession of arms 
must be viewed with suspicion, if not total opposition. 
History provides us as spectators with numerous examples of 
both extremes, together with a large number of other technically 
different legal structures, symptomatic of one or other less 
extreme interpretation of these respective rationales, and which 
may b~ located at different points on the continuum. Governments 
have for centuries made many kinds of legislative attempts at 
either I imiting or expanding the private avai lab ii ity of weapons 
for a broad range of reasons, and therefore, in the hope that it 
may perhaps serve the purposes of perspective, we now look at 
the background development of some of these approaches and the· 
situations in which they are found, as empirical examples. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND FIREARMS CONTROL: GENERAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
We are told by Greenwood (22) (on whom we shal I have to rely heavily 
for some of the fol lowing because of the unfortunate lack of other 
comparable references) that in England, for instance, the posses$ion 
of arms by civilians has been the subject of both Statute and 
Common Law for many centuries, although these have differed in 
purpose, form and efficacy as administrative and constitutfqnal 
changes came about with the passage of time. 
Back in Saxon times long before the introduction of the modern 
firearm, the society which existed could be classified as traditional 
in We~er 1 s terminology in the sense that functional differentation 
was sti I I relatively low. There was no standing army, nor any 
profess i ona I po I ice force as is common I y understood in the 
twentieth century. The defence of the society and the maintenance 
of law and order was highly localised, and dependent on q system 
under which individuals were encouraged to enrol in groups of 
about ten fami I ies, known at the time as tythings. These tythings 
were responsible for the behaviour of each of their members and 
if any individual broke the law the group was required to produce 
him for trial, or if the offender escaped, the group was I iable 
to a collective fine. If any fugitive from justice was suspected 
of being in the area al I able-bodied freemen were required to take 
part in the "Hue and Cry". 
In order to satisfactorily fulfil I his function under the system, 
every freeman had not only a right, but an absolute duty to keep 
and bear arms. The type of arms to be held varied according to the 
status and economic position of the holder, but even the poorest 
were included. (They were usually ordered to keep bows and arrows), 
To ensure conformity with the 1285 Statute of Winchester the 
Constable was to inspect al I arms twice a year, for it commanded 
inter al ia; " .......... that every man have in his house Harness 
for to keep the Peace after the antient Assize; that is to say 
22. Greenwood, C. Firearms Control 
Routledge & Kegan Paul; London; 1972; P.7 
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that every man between fifteen years of age and sixty years shal I 
be assessed and sworn to armour according to the qua I ity of 
their lands and goods". 
It would appear that in these times no clear differentiation 
was considered necessary between military and criminal threats 
to the continuing functional integration of the system. They 
were obviously identified as being distinct, but were nevertheless 
responded to by the same structural units, i.e., the tythings. 
The possession of arms by individuals, al I of whom were members 
of tythings, was therefore considered critical for the maintenance 
of the system from the points of view of dealing with both internal 
deviance and external mi I itary threats. 
Newton and Zimring (23) quote the 1328 Statute of Northampton 
as an example of early legislation attempting to control the 
carrying of arms. However, its purpose had ab so I ute I y nothing 
to do with the ownership of arms and the carrying of them by 
citizens in observance of their duty to be properly equipped 
for the "Hue and Cry". The specific command to keep and bear 
arms remained, but what did constitute an offence under this 
Statute was behaviour tantamount to an abuse of weapons by 
terrifying innocent p~ople. This was evidently an attempt to 
reinforce social solidarity by not only ensuring that the 
populace was properly armed and ready to defend Itself, but 
also that the bearing of arms would be accompanied by behaviour 
appropriate to the pursuit of group cohesiveness and mutual 
identification rather than disintegration and internal conflict. 
What was seen as a threat was not the individual ownership of 
weapons per se, but the abuse of them in terms of the goal 
pursuance pol icles of the polity. 
As firearms developed they began to enjoy the attention of soldiers 
and robbers alike, and this became a cause for concern especially 
for the Tudors. The central problem as regards gun ownership was 
23. Newton G, & Zlmring F. Firearms and Violence In American Life 
Report No. 7. To the National Commission on 
Causes and Prevention of Violence. Washington 
D.C. U.S. Government Printing Off ice ; 1969 
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not so much the apparent increase in armed crime because robbers 
were apt to use any weapon that was concealable and at this time 
firearms were not yet sophisticated enough to be relied upon for 
regular criminal use, nor was it the employment of guns by mi I itary 
opponents, but the fact that interest in and experiments with them 
were undermining the position of the longbow as the principal 
mi I itary weapon. 
Guns were al I very wel I as toys for the gentry to fiddle with 
for fun and sport, but they were crude, noisy, messy and highly 
inefficient in comparison with the longbow. As a result, in 
1533 Henry VI I I I eg is I ated against guns and crossbows because 
of his concern for both armed crime and the neglect of archery 
among his subjects. People who had an income of less than one 
hundred pounds per year- were forbidden to use or possess "crossbows, 
handguns (i.e., just about any firearm which could be carried by a 
single man) hagbutts, and demy-Hawkes" ·.Greenwood (24), and even 
this class could own guns as long as they were more than three-quarters 
of a yard in length, (presumably to obviate their potential 
concealabi I ity.) 
This legislation was, therefore, not in arly sense far-reaching. 
It did not affect the duty of al I men to keep arms both for the 
maintenance of order and the defence of the monarchy. It merely 
restricted the then novel and relatively inefficient firearms 
largely to the upper socio-economic status groups whilst maintaining 
longbows as the arms of the vast majority of the people because 
of their greater sui+0bi I ity, reliability and efficiency. 
The turn of the seven+Penth century in England heralded an era 
of groat constitution. 1 development, with its concomitant social 
and political imp I ications. Increasing sophistication had 
necessitated further divisions of iabour, and the existing mi I itary 
structures were among the first to be affected. By then firearms 
had replaced the longbow as the official mi I itary weapons, and at 
the same time more highly refined i·echniques of fighting had emerged 
24. Greenwood, C. Firearms Control 
lout ledge & Kegan Paul; London, 1972, P.8 
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during the Civil War, requiring a better dri I led, trained and 
specialized mi I itary force. The so-cal led "Trained Bands" (25) 
system developed to meet this·requirement. These consisted 
of men chosen on a largely voluntary basis, also trained by 
volunteers, but according toa system which generally restricted 
selection to the freeman classes, skilled workers, tradesmen 
and property owners. The duty to provide the finance for these 
more expensive weapons also shifted from the shoulders of individuals 
of al I ranks to those of the wealthier classes, and as the expense 
increased it eventually became the corporate burden of the community. 
The development of a more specialized part-time system of Trained 
Bands, as wel I as their ultimate outgrowth into a ful I-time 
professional mi I itla did not, however, affect the right and duty 
of al I classes to remain armed for personal and group defence. 
Charles I I, notwithstanding, added in 1671 to the Statute of 
Henry VI I I by prohibiting persons having an income of one hundred 
pounds or less from not only owning a gun or crossbow, but also 
from owning any greyhound, setting dog or long dog. (Persons 
earning below the required annual income, but of the rank of 
esquire, or owner or keeper of forests were exempt from this law.) 
The sole intention of this legislation by Charles I I was to ensure 
that game was reserved for the wealthier classes (26); Guns had 
by now become efficient hunting tools, far more so than longbows, 
and so no attempt was made to legislate against these weapons 
of the lower socio-economic classes. (This also explains why 
esquires and owners or keepers of forests were exempt from this 
law, i.e., so that they could effectively combat the threat of 
poaching by the lower classes on the game of the landed gentry.) 
This law had I ittle to do with general considerations of social 
solidarity, although it does in a sense express the extent of the 
polarisation between the nob ii ity and the commoners which had 
developed in seventeenth century England. 
This polarisation went further under the Catholic King, James I I 
who introduced the religious element into the discrimination 
between those who could own firearms and those who could not, 
but for totally different reasons than those of Charles I I quoted above. 
25. Ibid P.9 
26. Ibid P. I 0 
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James I l's obvious purpose in Introducing further firearms 
controls was to attempt to stabi I ize his rather shaky hold on the 
throne. He raised the numerical strength of the standing army 
to unheard-of levels, and methodically dismissed and disarmed 
Protestants of any importance so as to mai~tain the loyalties 
of the mi I itary. 
However, James I l's term was a short one, and he was soon replaced 
by Wil I iam of Orange, who was immediately presented with a Bil I 
of Rights by Par I iament. 
Par I iament complained bitterly that King James had "caused several 
good subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed at the same time 
when papists were both armed and employed, contrary to law," and 
dee I ared that henceforth "the subjects which are Protesi-ants may 
have arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and as 
al lowed by law" (27) Of centra'I importance here is the assumption 
of Parl lament that it was in no way claiming new rights, but 
merely recording those which had been understood to have existed 
under Common Law for centuries, but had been unjustifiably 
withdrawn by James I I. 
Par I lament jealously protected the rights of al I citizens to arm 
themselves even during the great social upheavals experienced 
during the industrial Revolution in England. It is true that these 
rights were suspended in some of the industrial areas, but the 
Commons intended this suspension to last only for two years and 
to apply to specific trouble spots alone, for it feared (regardless 
of the lack of validity of such fears) that a wholesale bloody 
revolution would fol low in the wake of the Peter loo Massacre 
in 1819. Suspected smuggling of arms and secret meetings of 
seditious intent caused Par I lament to take steps to control 
the situation by adopting the famous Seizure of Arms Act of 
1820, which authorised Justices of the Peace to issue warrants 
and confiscate arms which might be used by revolutionaries. 
27. Ibid, P.15 
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The onus lay on the owner to show that arms were not possessed 
for a purpose which was dangerous to the peace, but no Justice 
of the Peace could detain arms unless he had a prima facie reason 
for bet ieving that a defendant before him had evil designs on 
the good order of society. 
This Act had a lengthy and stormy passage through Part iament, 
and because of the contention of numerous mombers that it 
infringed fundamental constitutional rights was probably 
ultimately accepted only because it was felt that a strong 
and assertive reaction to the threat of revolution was essential. 
Revolutions, it was agreed, are seldom fol lowed by anything other 
th~h dictatorship in some form or other, and so the slight 
tinkering with one constitutional right was preferable to the 
loss of the constitution itself. 
During the remainder of the nineteenth century a number of other 
part iamentary attempts were made to introduce controls over the 
ownership of guns, particularly with the growing pub I ic awareness 
of armed crime. There was no evidence that there was even a 
,, 
gradual increase in the number of armed crimes, and therefore 
it is I ikely that this increased pub I ic awareness was due more 
to improved communications, the growth of the newspaper industry, 
the establishment of a progressively efficient pol ice force and 
more satisfactory methods of reporting crime, rather than a 
wave of violent lawlessness. Without acceptable empirical evidence 
for the need for legislative firearms controls these attempts were 
doomed to failure, and fai I they indeed did. The 1820 Seiz~re 
of Arms Act remained the only measure which effectively placed 
some power in the hands of the polity to I imit the pub I ic presence 
of firearms. As we have seen, however, it was by no means 
generally applicable, and in no way superceded the right of law-
abiding citizens to defend themselves with weapons. 
It was only in 1903, with the adoption of the Pistols Act that 
further real restrictions became law, and even these were of 
I ittle consequence. The primary purpose of this Act was to prevent 
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firearms accidents by ensuring that children and drunkards could 
not legally be possessed of guns. No mention was made of convicted 
criminals or certified lunatics, and so it seems uni ikely in the 
extreme that any motive to I imit crime was included. In order 
to qua I ify for permission to buy a gun from a retailer (the Act 
did not affect private sales), the prospective cl lent had to 
satisfy three requirements. He had to produce a current gun 
I icence (available without question from any Post Office on 
payment of ten shi I I ings), to give reasonable assurances that 
the proposed use of his pistol was I imited to the immediate confines 
of his property, or produce a statement to the effect that he was 
about to travel abroad for six months or more. 
This Act was of I ittle more than nuisance value as it did not 
stand in the way of any person reasonably determined to own a gun. 
It did not take Par I lament very long to recognise this, and so 
in 1920 the Firearms Bi I I was passed, thus tightening up some of 
the loopholes in the 1903 Act and constituting the most thorough 
attempt at firearms control that England had ever experienced. 
Drunkards, certified lunatics, criminals, children, al lens, were 
amongst others al I disqual if led from potential ownership at the 
discretion of a pol ice officer. Al I firearms owners had to be 
in possession of I icences granted by their local constabulary, 
regardless of whether the gun was bought privately or from 
a retailer. 
Further, more comprehensive legislation fol lowed under the name 
of the Firearms Act of 1937. This was both more detailed and 
more sophisticated than the 1920 Bi I I and fol lowed up the 
recommendations of the Bodkin Committee Report. Curiously enough 
an examination of the efficacy of existing legislation at the 
time was not included in the terms of reference of this committee. 
Greenwood (28) says that statistics relating to the criminal use 
of firearms during the period immediately prior to the Second 
World War do not appear even to have been gathered - a fact 
28. Ibid ~.70 
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which in itself indicates a satisfactory state of affairs in 
terms of crime rates. One wonders therefore, on what grounds 
the Bodkin Committee recommended a thorough tightening up of 
existing legislation, other than its "self-evident inadequacy", 
for there are no observable empirical bases for these recommendations. 
I 
The question of private ownership of firearms had by this stage, 
it would appear, shifted out of the realm of absolute right 
and dropped to a status somewhere between right and privilege. 
T~e pol ice were granted executive power to determine the fitness 
of individuals to be armed, and the result was that applicants had 
to persuade what constituted perhaps the most unsympathetic division 
of the polity of their good intentions. This must have been, on 
reflection, particularly true of cases involving handguns (which 
had by now become distinguished from rifles or long guns, and 
referred to automatic pistols and revolvers only), for target 
shooting and hunting with handguns were not yet fully developed 
as sports each in its own right, and therefore most appl !cations 
for handgun I icences must have claimed self-defence purposes. 
The pol1ce, the people whose duty it was to face violence daily 
in the execution of their duties, had by now bui It up an envied 
reputation for being unarmed, and could for particularly this 
reason not be expected to sympathize with a self-defence plea 
unless they felt that there really was some substance to it. 
What had been an absolute duty some centuries before was now 
I ittle mor0 than a privelege. From attempting to maintain 
interest in and practice with longbows for mi I itary purposes to 
ensuring that game WQS shot by the nobles only, and to attempting 
to uphold the stat~s quo in the face of the mounting threat of 
revolution to eventually legislating to curtai I firearms accidents, 
po I it i ca I restrict i ans on firearms ownership grew. Increasing 
social differentation led to the growth of new structures specialised 
in dealing with threats to social solidarity (in this case the 
army and the pol ice force) and was accompanied by a decrease in 
social solidarity itself. Heterogeneity and urbanization led to 
decreasing conformity, with the result that it was eventually 
considered both desireable and necessary by the polity to 
J 
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disqualify certain categories of deviants, as wel I as certain 
categories of I ikely, or potential deviants from firearms ownership. 
In the United States of America the trend has been similar, although 
much slower for a variety of reasons. When the conclusion was 
reached that the original U.S. Constitution drawn up by the 
Founding Fathers did not guard the security of the people nor 
of the states to the extent that had been intended, ten amendments 
were added in the name of the Bi I I of Rights, and became law in 
1791. The Second Amendment read as fol lows; 
"A wel I regulated Mi I itia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms sha 11 
not be infringed, 11 and this statement has served as the basis 
of the fight of American gun owners for the legal survival of 
their sporting and self-defence activities for many years. It 
is, in fact, probably the most important single reason for 
the slow progress (for progress they have ) of those Americans 
who have advocated the confiscation of al I privately owned 
firearms in that society. The latter, Daniel Glaser (29) for 
one, concentrate their attacks on the concept of "Mi Ii ti a", 
emphasizing their interpretation of that concept as referring 
to the specialised standing army and pol ice force, and not to 
al I citizens regardless of occupation. 
Defenders of the right to keep and bear arms on the other hand 
have argued that, in the first place, the individual is in the 
final analysis, his own ultimate means of defence, and secondly, 
as has been argued by Fielding L.Greaves (30) there is an important 
distinction between the provisions of the Second Amendment, and 
Article I Section 8 of the U.S.Constitution, which states that 
among the powers al lotted to Congress was the power, "········ 
to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Mi I itia ....• 11 
(31 ). What this indicates, according to Greaves, is that the Second 
Amendment could not therefore have been written in order to see 
to the arming of the Militia. This was already seen to. At 
29. Daniel Glaser Adult Crime and Social Pol icy 
Prentice-Ha I I ; N. Y.; 1972; P. 36 
30. Fielding L.Greaves "U.S.Gun Rights are Guaranteed" 
In Guns & Ammo Petersen; L.A. 
3 I • I b i d I p. 32 
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the same time the ten amendments which constituted the Bi I I of 
Rights nowhere included the power of Congress or any other body 
to amend, repeal or change any of the Amendments. The powers of 
Congress were clearly laid down in the Constitution, and while 
it could organize, arm and discipline the mi I itia, it could 
not disarm the people under any circumstances, or on any pretext. 
The intention of the Second Amendments was to secure the rights 
of al I citizens. 
The further development of this argument is of more relevance 
to the fol lowing Chapter and wi I I be dealt with more fully there. 
Of importance to us in this context is that historically speaking 
the U.S. has for the most part enjoyed a wel I known tradition 
of unrestricted firearms ownership. There has, however, been 
one notable exception, and this refers to the notorious 191 I 
Sul I ivan Law of New York. It is notorious for the simple reason 
that despite its vigourously applied restrictions on gun ownership 
in the name of crime control it has been, and sti 11 is ineffective 
at best. New York has for a long time enjoyed the unenviable 
reputation of being one of the most concentrated areas of violent 
crime in the world, and even the most superficial glance at the 
official statistics shows that the Sul I ivan Law has not, to say 
the least, even begun to look as if it might serve the purposes 
for which it was adopted (32). 
Under the provisions of this law it became an offence for 
anybody to own, purchase or carry a concealable firearm, including 
"other firearms" (which were not defined in the Act), without 
a permit. While this law might have been, as its supporters claim, 
an attempt to disarm the criminal in order to protect the 
constitutents, its detractors have held, with statistical support 
(33) that criminals have remair1ed armed whereas the Act has served 
to disarm the constituents. With the alleged easy avai labi I ity 
of guns on the "black market" it is uni ikely in the extreme, say 
32. Mason Wil Iiams 
33. 
Gun Law Hoax of Al I Time 
Guns & Ammo Magazine: Petersen; L.A. May 1972 
Gun World 
Gal I ant, California; October 1972 P.68 
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the detractors, that criminals, and especially members of New 
York's Organized Crime would apply to the pol ice for a permit and 
risk even the faintest possibility of being traced. The law has 
nevertheless remained in force, and it represents one of the most 
restrictive pieces of legislation in the U.S. prior to the 
Second Wor Id War. 
Notwithstanding, the American gun owners have been subjected to 
relatively I ittle legislative I imitation on their freedom 
to buy, use and bear weapons. Although gun laws differ from state 
to state in the U.S.,and are most restrictive, generally speaking, 
in the densely populated and industrial North-East, the situation 
is sti I I a reasonably free one in comparison with some European 
countries. 
Up unti I 1889 at least there were no restrictions on the carrying 
of arms, even concealed, in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland, 
while in Hungary only convicted criminals and the insane were 
excluded. Restrictions also existed in Germany, and the Netherlands 
whereas in Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Turkey 
and Russia a permit was required to carry any kind of firearm (34}. 
The situation in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution in 
1917, is of course, of important and lasting interest to this 
discussion. The political philosophy of the new ruling elite, true to 
the Marxist approach to legislation as a device for the maintenance, 
confirmation and legitimation of existing cleavages in society, 
is wel I i I lustrated in the fol lowing quotations from Lenin (who 
was himself nearly assasinated by a disillusioned woman radical 
with a pistol in 1918): "·· •.. one of the basic conditions for 
the victory of social ism - the arming of the workers, and 
the disarming of the bourgeosie" (35}; 
34. Greenwood C. 
35. Lenin 
Fi rearms Contro I 
Routledge and Kegan Paul; London, 1972 P.20 
Collected works; the Basic Tasks of the Dictatorship 
of the Proletariat in Russia 
Progress Pub I ishers Moscow; 1965 
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"Make mass searches and hold executions for found arms" (36) "Only 
the Soviets can effectively arm the proleteriat and disarm the 
bourgeosie. Unless this is done, the victory of social ism is 
impossible" (37). Trotsky, who was assasinated with an axe in 1940, 
had this to say: 11 To ensure quick Communist victory in civi I warfare, 
there arises the necessity of disarming the bourgeosie and arming 
the workers, of creating a Communist army" (38). 
These quotations, taken from the 1972 edition of Gun Digest 
Ced.John T.Amber; Follett Co; Chicago) show very clearly that 
the possession of arms by al I subjects under a Communist regime 
such as existed th~n and now in the Soviet Union was and is unthinkable 
for the reason that the fundamental pre-occupation of these rulers 
appears to have been with the exercise of power, regardless of authority 
variables and existing values. 
One is reminded, therefore of the words of Thomas Carlyle in his 
story of the French Revolution; "But see Cami I le Desmoul in, from 
the Caf~ de Foy, rushing out, sibyl I ine in face; his hair streaming, 
in each hand a pistol! He springs to a table: the Pol ice sate I I ites 
are eyeing him alive they shal I not take him; not they alive, him 
a I ive. 
This time he speaks without stammering: 
"Fri ends, sha I I we die I i ke hunted hares? Like sheep hounded 
into their penfold; bleating for mercy, where is no mercy, 
only a whetted knife? The hour is come; the supreme hour of 
Frenchmen and Man; when Oppressors are to try conclusions with 
Oppressed; and the word is, swift Death, or Deliverance forever. 
Let such hour be wel I-come! Us, ••.•.. one cry only befits: 
To Arms! Let universal Paris, universal France, as with the throat 
of the whirlwind sound only: To Arms! 11 (39). Such extreme 
examples of the polarisation of society into two opposing forces 
are not uncommon in the twentieth century (the present situation 
in Northern Ireland may serve as one example), and they reinforce 
our theoretical proposition that the more a government administers 
36. Lenin 
37. Lenin 
Collected Works: Vol .35; P.286 
Congressional Record, Apri I 28, 1970 
Quoted in Gun Digest, 1972 (ed.J.T.Amber) 
Collected Works P.466 
Quoted in Gun Digest, 1972 (ed. J.T.Amber) 
38. Daniels,Robert V. A'bocumentary History of Communism 
Random House, N.Y. 1960 P.90 
39. Carlyle, T. The French Revolution Miles & Miles;London; P.130 
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in terms of force (as opposed to authority) the less I ikely it 
is to agree in principle to the lawful possession of firearms 
by its subjects. It is now a popular saying that the armed man 
is the citizen and the disarmed man the subject. 
The increasing differentiation brought about by the division of 
labour, as mentioned, meant that new structures specialised in the 
use of firearms came into being, rhus, at least theoretically, 
removing some of the needs of individuals for remaining armed. 
The trend towards greater centralization of political authority 
is clear, and it has obviously also extended into the realm of 
firearms control. That the theoretical expectation of decreasing 
needs for firearms lacks empirical support is a phenomenon which 
wi I I be discussed in the fol lowing Chapter. 
It appears, in conclusion of this brief historical survey, that the 
freedom enjoyed by the individual to possess arms differs as 
radically between the U.S.A., Britain and Western Europe on the one 
hand, and the U.S.S.R., on the other, as their respective political 
ideologies differ. In the latter situation society is governed 
on the basis of coercion, and therefore only the "right" people 
are armed, i.e., agents of the polity. In the former situation 
citizenship seems to be a sufficient qua I ifying factor, provided 
that one can satisfy agents of the polity that there is no criminal 
intent. As ii lustrated, permission to keep and bear arms in both 
situations is granted by the same institutional role players, but 
the criteria employed differs markedly. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND FIREARMS CONTROL: CONTEMPORARY PBRSPE.CTIV~S 
The post World War 11 era has seen a tremendous increase in the 
complexity of the relationship between firearms control laws 
and the factors they are designed to influence; and this constitutes 
the primary reason for selecting the Second World War as the 
point of departure for our discussion of contemporary perspectives. 
In dealing with political democracies, in which societies are 
governed on the authority of a system of universal franchise, we 
assume that legislation enacted by such a government necessarily 
fol lows the dictates of the general value system as interpreted and 
manipulated by those who wield power in these respective societ.ies, 
and that they therefore do not regard the ownership of arms by 
their citizens as in any way constituting a threat to their goal 
pursuance policies. 
Nevertheless controls and restrictions oh the private possession 
of guns do in fact exist in these societies, by far the most 
popular reason for which is crime control: the assumption being 
that the elimination or at least severe restriction of the 
availability of firearms in society has a marked effect in reducing 
their prevalence in violent crime. Whether or not this is the 
case is a remarkably contentious issue, and at the same time 
represents a field of inquiry which appears to have been largely 
neglected by academics. 
As we have suggested before, the relationship between the actual 
content of I eg is I at ion and the "co 11 ect i ve mora I i ty" is not as 
simple as the classic democratic theorists ~o ardently believed,· 
and amongst the reasons for this is the fact that societies 
remain highly stratified and are increasing in heterogeneity. 
Values differ both for the hierarchical socio-economic strata 
and for the numerous sub-cultural segments which cut across 
these strata. 
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Actors playing the roles of legislators and judges who make and 
interpret the law inevitably bring the conceptual frameworks of 
their milieu in to play in their decision-making activities. 
Being almost exclusively wel I-educated, high-status persons who 
are perhaps also middle-aged, male, white, Protestants they 
employ behavioural references which are not uniform for the whole 
society, and so their conception of right and wrong, just and 
unjust, cannot be expected to agree, or even approximate with 
the conceptions of al I classes. 
The result unavoidably is that such behaviour as drunken driving, 
homosexuality, tax-evasion and theft are neither condemned nor 
encouraged to the same extent by the different sub-cultural 
pockets in society, but they remain ii legal and punishable by the 
State nevertheless. This sort of differential evaluation of 
formally ii legal acts may be the result of inadequate, inappropriate, 
or simply counter-socialization. But whatever, it is rooted in 
the fact that human beings learn values, and do not inherit them. 
Even in the modern state where the polity has so much control 
over education there is sti I I a failure to reach al I levels of 
society with the same intensity and success. 
The imp I ications are that while acts are differentially evaluated 
in terms of cultural variables, so are the artifacts of our culture. 
Motor-cars, airplanes, space-rockets and firearms mean different 
things to different people located throughout the sub-cultural 
segments in society as different values are attached to them. 
Hand-guns are used for self-protection, hold-ups, competitive 
target-shooting, hunting, collecting, bal I istics research, 
informal pl inking, and many other reasons. The trend in the 
West, however,appears to have been of late for middle-class, 
middle-aged legislators to look upon them as the tools of 
criminals, and to act against their avai lab ii ity in the hope 
that criminals would be prevented or deterred from using 
guns to achieve their ii legal ends. This is indeed a 
fascinating trend, for the reasons for this approach have been, 
and sti I I are, by and large unclear. 
6 I • 
It would appear to have been simply assumed that the stricter . . '. ,. ' ' ~ . . . 
the ~Lin laws the less f.fkefy are firearms to be used in crime. 
(The recommendations of the 1;3odkin Committee serve as an excel lent 
' . ',. 
examp I e) ( 40) • 
In Brt+a1n, although the~ohstitutional right of citizens of 
al I ranks to keep and bear arms for the abovementioned diversifying 
nu.mbe; of .reaso~s ~as remat'ned in princjpf e operative, they have 
. ' . . - ; ( ' . 
s i nee War Id War 11 become .subject to more and more po I icy 
. . . 
restrictions in the atte~pt to contain violent crime. The mere 
! . 
presence of many thousands of firearms in Britain, belonging to 
former members of the Home.Guard, and now lying about unnecessarily 
in the peace that fol lbwed, would appear to have been considered 
a grave threat to al I iaw-abiding citizens, for they could so 
easi fy faf I into the hands of criminals. 
For the first decade and more after the war the r·igouriousfy 
appl led gun control laws in England were to be envied, for .f.ri 
. ' 
that country criminals hardly ever carried a gun, nor was it 
necessary for either the pol ice or citizens to bear arms for 
se1f-prot~ction. The streets of London and other major cities 
were safe in comparison with major U.S. urban areas and the 
general impression appeared to be that after m?re than thirty 
years of strict controls (i.e., since 1920) these restrictions had 
proved their ab if ity to I imit armed crime. Sportsmen who aimed 
their firearms at clay-pigeors or paper targets rather than 
bank-tellers could _stll I buy firearms provided that they were 
prepared to subject themselves to the bureaucratic acrobatics 
which their I icence applications involved. This system, 
felt its supporters, ensured that people whose motives were 
suspect would not be able to fay their hands on firearms, and 
social solidarity would therefore be enhanced. 
40. Greenwood, C. Firearms Control 
Routledge & Kegan Paul; London; 1972 
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TABLE 1 
YEAR TOTAL ROBBERIES ARMED ROBBER I ES FIREARMS ROBBERIES 
1946 299 Not avail ab I e 25 
1947 354 132 46 
1948 373 110 28 
1949 280 83 13 
1950 256 80 18 
1951 214 63 10 
1952 298 99 18 
1953 295 105 17 
1954 241 76 4 
1955 237 84 13 
1956 314 133 19 
1957 398 136 20 
1958 558 224 35 
1959 671 312 51 
1960 763 307 39 
1961 963 407 53 
1962 1017 407 62 
1963 973 380 43 
1964 1266 535 92 
1965 1609 702 115 
1966 1982 852 142 
1967 2012 791 165 
1968 1910 838 225 
1969 2236 950 272 
1970 2369 997 274 
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What differences exist between figures for 1951 up to 1966 
we would perhaps ignore as statistically insignificant fluctuations. 
Greenwood suggests (43) that there may wel I be a connection between 
the abolition in Britain of the death penalty in 1965, and the 
dramatic increase in the use of firearms in robberies since then, 
as both Tables 1 and 11 demonstrate. 
In an age in which the death penalty is seeing less and less 
frequent use in contemporary democracies, if not complete 
abolition on the grounds that it is barbaric and outmoded (i.e., 
it is not legitimized by the general value system), and that it 
is ineffective as a deterrent factor because murders most often 
occur within immediate family structures (this is itself a highly 
questionable assumption at best) and represent the exercise bf 
emotion rather than reason, the justification for Greenwood's 
suggestion may I ie in the fact that in terms of armed robberies 
we are dealing with calculating and often career criminals to 
whom a gun is a tool of the trade in the sense that it represents a 
dramatic increase in the possibi I ity of escape, if caught in the 
act of breaking the law. 
43. Greenwood, C. Firearms Control 
Routledge & Kegan Paul; London; 1972; P.255 
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In cases such as these the threat to I ife and I imb which has 
to be faced by unarmed pol Icemen is greatly increased in what 
would appear to be an intentional way on the part of the armed 
robber, for by using a gun he is placing his escape above the I ife 
of a pol iceman acting on the course of his duties. In the U.S. 
law enforcement agents are for the most part armed and in a better 
position to defend themselves, but there have nevertheless been 
strong indications that a return to capital punishment may occur 
for certain categories of crimes (including the murder of a 
pol iceman). During the 1972 Presidential Election the State of 
California voted overwhelmingly for a return of the death sentence, 
and in March 1973 President Nixon was quoted (44) as arguing 
"that the only way to attack crime in America is the way crime 
attacks our people - without pity" in justifying his cal I for a 
return to capital punishment. 
In Britain there does not yet appear to have been much support 
for such a return, although the Hou?e of Commons is reported (45) 
to have voted on the 9th Apri 1,1973, against an attempt by 
Mr. Edward Taylor (Conservative) to have capital punishment 
re-introduced specifically for murder involving firearms and 
explosives, and for the murder of a pol iceman or prison officer. 
The House voted against Mr. Taylor's motion by 320 - 178, a 
clear majority of 142 in favour of the continued abolition of 
the hangman's rope as a form of punishment, which Mr. Roy Jenkins 
described as "ineffective, impracticable, damaging, and wrong. 
The penalty is too final to be control led by the frailty of human 
judgment". The rapid increase in the use of guns in crime has not 
yet resulted in an escalating cal I for violence in return, but it 
certainly has cal led into question the efficacy of existing controls. 
44. Time Magazine, March 25,1973; P.50 
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Quite clearly, says Greenwood (46), British gun control laws 
do not work. They were designed to keep guns out of the hands 
of criminals and thereby to I imit their use in armed robberies, 
but they cannot be considered to have been successful. One 
could, of course argue that were it not for these controls at 
present exercised the ann~al number of firearms robberies would 
be much higher. Greenwood, (47) however, rejects this argument 
on the grounds that armed robbers are hardly ever in legal 
possession of the guns they use at the time of their crimes in 
the first place, and secondly, that there is no case on record 
of a criminal applying to the pol ice for a I icence to possess 
a gun for the purpose of shooting a pol iceman or night-watchman 
who might disturb him. 
Firearms are quite freely avai I able on the "black market" for 
a sum of money, with no questions asked, and these cannot be 
traced, for even if the serial numbers are not filed down there 
are no records of the criminal's ownership of a particular gun 
anywhere. Armed robbers, in fact, would appear to make a point 
of ensuring that their guns are not I icensed in their own names, 
and this, together with the figures presented in Tables 1 and 11 
must seriously cal I into question the purpose and role of firearms· 
controls in Britain. If they do not serve the purposes for which 
they were designed, then, indeed, what purposes do they serve? 
If any commission is to be appointed in the future, such as the 
Bodkin Committee already referred to, it is to be hoped that 
before any recommendations are made to Par I iament, a study be 
made of the efficacy of gun contro I I aws. It is not, as has been 
shown, adequate to simply assume the need for stricter and 
stricter laws without any observable empirical support for such 
an assumption. 
In the United States of America there is also evidence of the 
widespread existence of this assumption, which appears to go hand 
in hand with the conception of firearms primarily as tools for the 
unlawful perpetration of civi I violence. 
46. Greenwood, C. British Gun Controls Don't Work 
Guns & Arms; Petersen L.A.;December 1972, P.33 
47. Ibid P. I 02 
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The Kerner Report (48) for instance, provides an example, for 
it contends that "Federal Legislation, if enacted, should be 
precisely drafted, with a clear definition of al I operative 
terms, so as to preserve scrupulously the constitutional rights 
of al I Americans. Such legislation should be combined, as the 
President <Lyndon B. Johnson) recommended, with the Federal 
Firearms Bi I I. Both are important means of restricting the 
interstate movement of forces of destructiqn". 
Federal Legislation was indeed enacted in the name of the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, and among its provisions were a ban 
on the interstate sale of firearms, together with a ban on the 
importation of cheaply made, unsafe and short-barrel led handguns, 
usually of Continental origin, and referred to in the U.S.A. 
as "Saturday Night Specials", because of their alleged lack of 
sporting or any other lawful useful lness. 
This legislation came at a time when pub I ic debate on the issue 
of firearms control had grown in volume and intensity, especially 
since the assasination in 1963 of President John Kennedy as he 
drove through the streets of Dal las, Texas, at the hands of a 
gunman. A shocked nation had not fully recovered when the news 
of the assasination, also by a gun, of Senator Robert Kennedy came 
as he campaigned for the Presidency in California. However, 
what immediately intrigues the student of such legislation is the 
fact that. none of tho abovementioned murders was carried out with 
a "Saturday Night Special", nor is it clear how a ban on the 
interstate sale of firearms could have prevented them, or thousands 
of other firearms crimes. 
In 1972, also in the process of campaigning for the Presidency, 
Governor George Wal lace of Alabama was shot and crippled at a 
shopping centre in Maryland. 
48. Kerner,Otto (Chairman) Report of the National Advisory Commission 
On Ci vi I Disorders · ' 
Bantamy, N.Y; 1968; P.524 
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He was shot at almost point-blank range with a handgun which 
could not be classified as a "Saturday Night Special". 
Nevertheless the Governor was quoted as saying in hospital 
later that his attitude to handgun controls had not changed (49) 
"Federa I I aws w i I I keep guns out of the hands of I aw-abiding 
citizens, but those who break the law wi 11 have them anyway". 
It would seem, say the opponents of gun control, that a man who 
is intent on committing as serious a crime as murder is as I ikely 
to be concerned about the fact that he is not in legal possession 
of the gun he is going to use (and is thus I iable to a fine) 
as he is I ikely to be concerned about exceeding the speed I imit 
in his bid to escape a pursuing pol ice car. Any attempt to 
restrict the possession of firearms in an existing situation in 
which mi I I ions are in circulation is more I ikely to simply 
penalise the legitimate gun-owner and have no effect whatsoever 
on the criminal gun-owner. However, the supporters of strict 
gun laws have argued that firearms, particularly handguns, 
are of suspect sporting value to begin with, and any real attempt 
to I imit their avai labi I ity must itself affect their prevalence 
in armed crime. Senator Edward Kennedy, brother of the two 
assassinated Kennedys has, for one, adopted a position strongly 
in favour of strict gun control laws. He argues (50) that 
during the years 1960 to 1970 the number of murders in the United 
States, from al I causes, increased by 56% from 9000 to 15810. 
By 1970 65% of these murders were committed with guns. Of the 10,000 
crimes, at least 52% were committed with pistols and revolvers. 
Senator Kennedy is therefore convinced that if the U.S. is to 
develop "meaningful action" to halt crime and violence in that 
country, al I guns have to be registered and al I gun-owners 
licensed. This, he feels, is the way to stem the flow of weapons 
to those who are intent on firearms abuse. 
\ 
49. Constantine, J.R. Shooting T_!.f:0_~ 
Peoria Journal Star; 111; September 1972; P.16 
50. Senator Edward M. Kennedy ~J:!..°-?ting Times 
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The proliferation of nearly 200 mil I ion guns in American households 
(Kennedy's estimate) demands effective controls in order to stop 
the daily kil I ing and violence their presence generates, he concludes~ 
Senator Kennedy, in terms of his be I i ef that in order to contro I 
lawlessness with firearms a ban should be placed on the flow of 
pistols and revolvers to criminals, introduced a measure in the 
Senate authorizing a ban on al I non-sporting, hand-held firearms, 
and in addition making it unlawful for any person to own a gun 
that is not registered or to possess a gun without being I icensed. 
The two underlying assumptions which deserve attention here are 
firstly the notion that the mere presence of firearms, regardless 
of their cultural or sub-cultural definitions, is itself a factor 
which generates civi I violence, and secondly, that those who own 
firearms for unlawful purposes acquire them through the same lawful 
channels as do sportsmen. Glaser (51) has also reported that there 
is a direct relation between the presence of guns and the homicide 
rates in society. In the United States, he argues, the children 
of poverty-stricken immigrants have usually been responsible for 
the higher rate of assaultive crime, (with the exception of those 
in several ethnic groups such as the Chinese and Jews, where the 
family and ethnic community display strong ties and appear able 
to inculcate anti-violence values). 
Thus in the 1920's and 1930's the highest rates of violent crime 
in northern cities were found among young adults of Polish and 
Italian descent. In recent years the murder rate of Blacks 
has been over twice that of Whites, but the rates for each group, 
says Glaser, have the same corelates, which suggests that they have 
the same causes. Within both racial groups murder rates have been 
highest in the South and amongst the poorest and least educated. 
The Blacks, however, are more concentrated in the South and generally 
poor and less educated than Whites, and in 95% of cases the murderer 
and victim are of the same race. 
51. GI aser, D. Adult Crime and Social Pol icy 
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Glaser feels that the increase in homicide rates since 1958 
may be the result of three factors. Firstly, the large-scale 
population migration from areas which previously had the most 
intense sub-culture of violence. Secondly, the population trend 
in the sense that it reflects the post World War 11 baby boom, 
because there exists today an increased number of U.S. citizens 
in the twenty to thirty year age bracket, which is the peak age 
for murder. And thirdly, the possession of firearms by more 
people fol lowing the urban riots of the 1960's. The sale of handguns 
quadrupled from 1962 to 1968 and the sale of long guns doubled, 
(this is verified· by Newton and Zimring 1969) (52). The percentage 
of homicides caused by firearms has increased steadily each year 
from 53% in 1961 to 65% in 1968, with half of them due to handguns. 
Knives and other cutting instruments accounted for 19%, blows or 
strangulation without weapons 8%, and other methods (clubs, poisons. 
drownings etc) 8%. 
Glaser does not tel I us; however, on what grounds we can accept 
his statement that increased legal firearms ownership is reflected 
in the increasing use of firearms in crime. Al I his statistics 
show is that a greater percentage of murderers nowadays use guns 
rather than knives, clubs, etc. How, for example, does he know 
that other factors, for example the sub-cultural definition of 
guns, have remained constant? Nor does he demonstrate how firearms 
control laws which he advocates would serve to I imlt the overal I 
murder-rate. 
In the North-Eastern states, continues Glaser (53) where laws 
have long been the most strict, 46% of murders result from 
the use of firearms: in the South, where they are least strict, 
guns account for 73%. In the North-Central states 70% of murders 
are caused by firearms, and in the West they are responsible for 
61%. In Detroit, where handgun owners are registered under state 
law but I icences are hot greatly restricted, the number of homicides 
by gun increased year-by-year in 1965-8, almost in direct proportion 
to the four-fold increase in gun owners during this period. 
52. Newton G.and Zimring F. Firearms and Violence in American Life 
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The source of Glaser's.figures quoted above is not known, but 
even if they be granted validity, they certainly do not amount 
to a clarifying statement of the relationship between firearm 
murders and the number of firearm owners and strength of gun 
control laws. Other statistics are available and quotable 
which are highly damaging to Glaser's argument. For example, 
the F.B. I. Uniform Crime Report of 1971 (54) quotes Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin as having the lowest per capita crime rate in the nation. 
With regard to the seven major criminal offenses in the U.S. 
the Report I ists twenty-seven cities of populations of 400,000 
and over. Milwaukee is number twelve in size with a population 
of 717,099, and New York (North-East in Glaser's analysis) is 
the largest with 7,900,000. New York, with eleven times the 
population has twenty-five times the incidence of major crimes. 
In New York gun contra I I aws are very strict indeed, as a resu It 
of the 191 I Sul I ivan Act, whereas in Milwaukee they are non-existent. 
How then does the legal avai labi I ity of firearms or the enactment 
of strict laws affect their use in crime? 
As a result of its enviable reputation as the most non-violent 
of al I major U.S.cities, the Milwaukee Pol ice Department is 
quoted ( 55) as having issued the fo I I owing statement: "The 
Department does not favour gun registration and feels that strict 
gun control would never control the avai labi I ity of guns to 
criminals. We do not favour registration because it is cumbersome, 
time consuming, and ineffective~ To have any value it should 
keep guns from criminals. The law abiding citizen should not be 
deprived of the right and privilege to own guns which deter 
attacks on a citizen in his home. The right to hunt and the 
right to engage in target practice should prevai I for citizens". 
In New York City, on the other hand, enjoying as it does the 
strictist gun control laws in the country, the Sul I Ivan Act 
is enforced by the Pol ice Department. 
54. Mi I I er, B. Your Pol ice: Milwaukee, Wisc 
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According to Col.Edward Becker, (56) the number of pistol 
permits granted has been gradually reduced over the years, 
particularly the type issued to store owne~s. In 1930, 6,363 
firearm permits were issued, and the number was reduced to 
282 by 1966. But in New York City the crime rate has steadily 
increased during these same years. Between 1940 and 1966, 
the murder rate increased by 237%, while Pol ice Department 
expenditures rose by 232% and the population increased by 
only 4%. Judged by the seizure record, there are now more 
i I legal guns actually in circulation than ever before. "C!ear.l.y", 
says Col .Becker, "the causes of crime I ie elsewhere than in the 
legal ownership of firearms by the citizens of New York 11 (57). 
He rejects the Newton and Zimring cal I for a ban or the sale of 
handguns on the grounds that in terms of their own estimates 
only ,018% of al I handguns are used in homicides, whereas 99,98% 
are not, There is more to the definition, then, of firearms 
than simply their ki I I ing potential, and this, he feels, ought 
to be taken account of by legislators. 
With the situation as it is in New York it is perhaps smal I 
wonder that when in early 1972 Life Magazine pub I ished a questionaire 
for readers to ti 11 in with their own opinions about the prevalence 
of crime and what should be done about it, it was able to report 
that among the 43, 000 rep I i es received, "Gun contra I I aws found 
no sympathy" ( 58) . 
Nevertheless the problem of how to deal with armed crime remains 
highly contentious and I ittle understood. As we have attempted 
to show, those who do not support strict registering or I icensing 
laws, or total confiscation for that matter, hold that the 
cultural and sub~cultural definitions of firearms are critical 
because of the many uses to which they can be put. They often 
point to what is perhaps the best i I lustration of this point. In 
Switzerland where target-shooting is something of a national sport, 
56. Becker, Col .Edward 
57. Ibid P.5 
58. E.B.Mann 
Guns 
Pub I isher's Development Corp; 111, 
Nov. 1972, P.5 
Gun World 
Gal I ant; California; May 1972; P.17 
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and where there is hardly a family which does not have one 
or more guns in the home, the use of firearms in crime is 
almost unheard-of. 
One cannot, they argue, conclude that the possession of guns 
is itself a major cause of violence, nor that the attempted 
elimination of such private possession wi I I itself be a major crime~ 
reducing factor. 
Both sides in the argument as to the validity of gun control laws, 
however, would appear to be concerned about the same problem, 
i.e., armed crime, for regardless of what position one adopts 
vis-a-vis firearms control it nevertheless remains a serious 
problem in contemporary societies. Both see the problem as 
threatening the good order of society, but they differ in their 
ideas as to how legislation is to be applied to solve it. 
In contemporary Soviet society, however, there appears to be 
very I ittle pub I icly expressed difference of opinion. Stal in 
is quoted as having said that "If the opposition disarms 
we! I and good. If it refuses to disarm, we shal I disarm it 
ourselves,'' in his Reply to the Discussion on the Pol it I cal 
Reports of the Central Committee, December 7th, 1927; 
This reflects a somewhat simpler attitude to the cha! lenge 
of opposition than is characteristic, say, of the U.S.A., and 
together with the quotations from Lenin and Trotsky referred to in 
the previous chapter, provide us with the contrasts displayed 
in contemporary perspectives on firearms control. 
Both the historical and present-day perspectives we have covered 
in this discussion lead it seems to the conclusion that there is 
no direct relationship between firearm~ control laws and the 
prevalence of guns in crime. It is not sufficient to simply 
produce figures showing that a greater number of crimes are 
committed with guns today than was the case thirty years ago, 
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for this 9uestlon Is a complex empirical one. It is~ question 
deserving of more than simpl lstlc cause-and-effect analyses. 
Those who argue iH favour of strict tontrol laws have sti I I 
to offer us more than just this. The South African situation 
presents, If anything, an even more complex set of variables, 
and an attempt to come to terms with them wl I I be made in 
the fol I owing chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SOCIAL LEGISLATION AND FIREARMS CONTROL: SOUTH AFRICA 
The area which today constitutes the Republ le of South Africa has 
for a long time been subject to varying degrees of strict firearms 
control laws. The rationale underlying these laws cannot, of 
course, be understood in isolation, but must be viewed against 
the background of the historical situations in which they 
operated. However, any in-depth attempt to analyse the historical 
development of the relationship between these two variables would 
be far beyond the scope of this chapter. We wi I I aim therefore 
in these few short pages, simply at a superficial introduction 
to the question so far as it is relevant before moving on to 
a discussion of present-day legislation. 
Long before the declaration of Union in 1910, as the fol lowing 
discussion wi I I show, the four provinces each required that the 
owners of firearms register or I icence their weapons, fai I ing 
which there existed the possibi I ity of the imposition of severe 
(for those days) fines. Besides these restrictions, however, 
a new element, that of race, was introduced into the structure 
of firearms legislation, and this element remains with us today, 
although it is not as strictly discriminatory . 
. The Natal Almanac and Register of 1883 CP.84), for example, 
contains the fol lowing two paragraphs, with reference to firearms 
ownership: 
'' 5. The possession of unregistered Firearms constitutes a 
contravention of the law, for which the person offending is 
I iable to punishment. 
6.The sale or barter of Firearms or Ammunition to Natives 
resident in Natal or the adjacent countries is strictly prohibited 
by I a1-1". 
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In 1886 the legislative situation ·in the Orange Free State was 
as fol lows: "No one can sel I guns or other weapons, gun powder 
or cartridges without a permit from the Landdrost of his district, 
and at no time more than ten pounds of gunpowder to one person. 
No one may sel I or deliver to a coloured person any gun, pistol, 
or other weapon, or gunpowder or other munitions of war. without 
the special authority of the State President under a penalty of 
twenty-five to a hundred pounds sterling. Every dealer in gunpowder 
etc., must take out a I icenco11 .(59) What is of particular interest 
is the inclusion of the phrase "or other weapons" which are nowhere 
defined, in the law. This would mean that, strictly speaking, it 
was i I legal to own any object, be it an empty bottle or a nai 1-
f i le, which may conceivably be used as a weapon, nor could one 
sel I any such object to a Native. This provision gave the 
authorities almost the proverbial "blank cheque'' in dealing with 
alleged crlminal or politically undesireable elements within 
their borders. 
In the Transvaal in 1897 we are told that "similar provisions 
to those existing in other parts of South Africa to control and 
restrict the sale of gunpowder, firearms and explosives generally, 
are in force (in the Transvaal). Permits are required for their 
purchase by al I except burghers of the State. These are by 
law al lowed to purchase, practically without permit, gunpowder 
and requisites for shooting game; while, to assure every able-
bodied burgher being in possession of arms of precision, they 
are supplied at cost, and gratis if they cannot afford to pay 
for them, with breech-loading rifles and ammunition. Attempts have 
been made to manufacture gunpowder, the ingredients of which are 
found in some parts of the State, but the factory erected is 
unused and large sums are spent annually by the Executive in 
keeping up the stock of firearms and ammunition .. " (60). Evidently, 
then, burghers were encouraged to arm themselves both for the 
shooting of game, and the defense of the State, whereas non-
burghers, Natives and Coloureds included, were required to apply for 
permits in order to satisfy the Executive of their good intentions. 
59. "Leg a I Information" 
Orange Free State Directory and Almanac for 1885 
J.N.Eagle; Caxton Printing Works; Phi I ippol is; O.F.S. 
60. "Gunpowder and Fi rearms" 
Argus Annual for 1897 Cape Town, 1897, P.265 
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Legislative provisions were somewhat more restrictive in the 
Cape Colony. Sir George Cath~art's Ordinance, 2 of 1853 made 
it known that "the penalty for delivery of f ire9rms or ammunition 
to any person not producing and depositing the certificate of a 
Resident Magistrate (or Justice of the Peace, if there be no 
Resident Magistrate within twelve miles) is a fine not exceeding 
five hundred pounds sterling, or imprisonment for any term not 
exceeding seven years 11 (61) With rE)ference to the sale of 
firearms to Natives the Ordinance commandE)d that permits, 
certificates, and I icences for pos~ession wer~ not to be granted 
without permission in writing from the Colonial Secretary or Secretary 
for Native Affairs. It hardly needs much imagination to realise 
that this sort of permission was hard to come.by indeed. Failure 
to comply, however, could lead to a fine not exceeding five hundred 
pounds sterling, or imprisonment for any term not exceeding five 
years. 
The penalties applicable in cases of deviance from Cathcart's 
Ordinance were extremely harsh in comparison with those in 
operation in the neighbouring territories, put none so much 
as that provided for High Treason. The Ordinance was quite 
emphatic that "delivery of firearms and ammunition to any person 
whomsoever with the purpose, design or knowledge that the same 
should or would be conveyed to and made use of by the Queen's 
enemies, or by any of her· subjects in rebel I ion, 1s •••••••• 
declared to be an overt act of high treason, and any person convicted 
of it is assured that he shal I suffer death ~s a traitor". (62) 
The so-cal led Peace Preservation Act, No. 13 of 1878 tightened 
up existing legislation and gave the Governor wider powers than 
he had previously enjoyed. Sir Alfred Mi Iner, particularly, 
cal led these powers into operation in 1901 when, in a situation 





63. The Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette 
Cape Town, Tuesday, January 22, 1901. 
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it became ii legal for any person not belonging to one of the 
exempted classes (i.e., Magistrates, Justices of the Peace, 
Field-cornets, members of Her Majesty's Naval or Military Forces, 
or any armed Pol ice Force or Colonial Corps), to have in his 
possession any arms, weapons or ammunition. Al I owners of 
firearms were required to apply for I icences to retain them, but 
Milner's Notice spelt bad news for some." With regard to rifles, 
and ammunition for rifles, no I icence should be granted for these, 
unless on a special order from the Prime Minister. It is not 
desireable that any person not belonging to one of the exempted 
classes should under present circumstances be al lowed to retain 
a rifle. As to revolvers, I icences to keep these may be granted 
to al I persons in regard to whom there is no reasonable ground for 
suspecting that they wil I put them to an improper use". (64) This 
was not an attempt by Mi Iner to deprive individuals of weapons 
for their own self-defense in that he made it clear that revolvers 
could be freely granted. What he sought to I imit was those 
firearms, particularly breech-loading rifles, which could be put 
to effective mi I itary use. Considering the background against 
which this order was issued, it would seem to have been a 
reasonably lenient measure, for it displays no evidence 
of any intention to completely disarm the population. 
These pre-Union Statutes, Proclamations,and No.tices were. 
finally repealed by Act No. 28 of 1937, which sought to "consolidate 
and amend the laws in force in the various provinces of the'U~ion 
relating to arms and ammunition''.(65) The Act cal led for the 
complete re-I icensing of al I privately owned firearms in the Union, 
and provided for an amnesty period of six months, during which 
time al I owners of guns could submit their I icence appl !cations· 
to their local magistrates whose duty it was to determine 
whether or not the possessor was a "fit and proper person" to 
retain possession of his f irearm(s). Failure to comply rendered 
the offender I iable to imprisonment, without the option of a fine, 
for a period not exceeding ten years. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Statutes of the Republ le of South Africa. Arms and Ammunition P.5 
S.A. Government Printer; Cape Town. 
A similar penalty awaited any individual who was convicted of 
supplying a firearm to a non-European. The Act was quite exp I icit 
in laying down that "no I icence to possess 3n arm shal I be issued ...• 
to any person other than a F.urorenn without the approval of the 
Mini s-rer"; However, being non-F:u 1~opea n cl id noi- in terms of the 
Ad itself amount to a declaration of unfitnes:, to p0'.358SS an arm, 
but simply that di f foren-r channels hc:id to he employ8d when 
submitting Ii cence app I icat ions. That this prevision meant that 
the granting of I icences to the different race groups could thereby 
be subject to different pol icy decisions is obviously accepted, 
but this could just as easily have been achieved hy employing 
uniforn1 application procodures. 
In 1968 the Dangerous Weapons Act (No. 71) was 2dopted by the 
Republican Par I iC'lmE?nt and among~t its provisions were further 
resiTictions in respect of -lhe posses~;ion, manufacture sale or 
supply of dangerous weapons. The uni icensed possession by any 
person of whai· the Act defined as a dangerous weapon became an 
offence unless that person could prove that he at no time had any 
intc-:niion of using it for an unlawful pur·pose. WhCJt is of 
particul<'lr relevance to thi~:; di:oCUS'.·>ion, howc~ver, vrns "!-he 
introduction in the Act of i hr:: i rnpos it ion of rr·esc1- i bed sentences 
1vhcre dm1g0rous v1eapo11s 01- f i 1·ea rms had been U'.:;ed in the commission 
of crimes involving violence. This displayed a differentiation, 
and a corresponding insight on the part of the legislators 
responsible, not evirlanccd in contemporary firearms control 
legi~;lation enacted in Britain, Europe, and at Federal level in 
the U.S.A. It showed quite clearly that Par I iament accepted in 
principle that there existed a fundamental distinction between the 
private possession of firearms on the one hC'lnd, and their prevalence 
in violent crime on the other, and that the iwo rlid not necessarily 
co-vory. Porl lament appeored to recognise ihat there existed a 
val id reason, or reasons, for the continued legal possession of 
firearms at the private citizen level, and that in order to restrict 
the use of guns in violent crime one hcid to communicate to the 
criminal that it was not worth his while to carry a gun in the commission 
of his i I legal deeds, rather than confiscate legally owned firearms or 
otherwise penalise law-abiding citizens. 
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Legislation was then passed which provided for punishment for 
the i I legal use of firearms while at the same time carefully 
preserving the right of citizens to keep and bear arms for legal 
purposes. As mentioned above, this is a distinction which is not 
evidenced in the legislative attempts of Western governments 
known to the author in their attempt to control and restrict 
crimes of violence committed with guns. 
An extract from the preamble to this Act reads as fol lows; 
"To provide for certain prohibitions and resfrictions in 
respect of the possession, manufaci·ure, sale or supply of certain 
objects; to provide for the imposition of prescribed sentences 
where dangerous weapon'.3 or firearms have been used in the commission 
of offences involving violence, ....... 11 (66). Henceforth any 
person above the age of eighteen years, convicted of an offence 
involving violence to any other person together with proof that 
a dangerous weapon or a firearm (the Act makes this distinction) 
(67) had been used in the ki 11 ing or injury, would receive a 
mandatory sentence ranging from two to eight years, except in 
cases where the death sentence was imposed or the convicted 
person was declared an habitual criminal. 
The provisions of the Act were among the few that were not amended 
or repealed at the commencement of Act No. 75 of 1969, referred to 
as the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 (68), which involved the 
complete administrative overhaul of firearms control in South 
Africa. Essentially this Act was aimed at providing a uniform 
set of procedures for I icence applications, and their processing 
by the officials whose task it would be to decide on their merits 
or otherwise. Decision-making in this : respect became the task 
of the Commissioner of Pol ice, and not the magistrates as had 
been the case under the 1937 Act. Previously magistrates had 
been faced with the burden of deciding whether ot not an 
ind iv i dua I app I i cant was a "fit and proper per-son" more or I es~•, 
66. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa -·Arms and A_mmunitio.~ 
S.A. Government Printer; Cape Town P. 171 
67. Ibid P.173 
68. Government Gazette, 18th.June, 1969 
S.A. Government Printer, Cape Town 
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it appears, according to his own set of criteria, and records 
of such applications remained in the magisterial districts in 
which they were made. After 1969 a central firearms register was 
to be established In Pretoria and al I appl icatlons were to be 
dealt with there and recorded by computer. 
While magistrates retained the right, under this new Act, to 
declare persons unfit to possess arms for periods they felt 
were appropriate If they had convicted them of offences relating 
to the abuse of dangerous weapons, the Commissioner of Pol ice 
was delegated the authority to turn down I icence applications 
as wel I as to declare persons unfit to own guns. Where this 
occurred the law provided that the individual concerned had the 
right to make personal representations to the Commissioner and to 
be accompanied by Counsel of his own choiceM The Commissioner 
was also compel led to give reasons for his decisions, and if the 
Individual concerned remained dissatisfied he could lodge an 
appeal with the Minister of Pol ice, who could order the 
Commissioner to change his decision. 
The Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969 Is worthy of close study for, 
whereas It clearly represents an attempt by the polity to achieve 
a greater degree of centralised control over the possession of 
firearms in South African society and to streamline the 
administration of legislative provisions in this regard, there 
is no evidence in the new law, nor in any par I iamentary pol icy 
statements to suggest that private ownership of firearms is to 
be thereby further restricted. On the contrary, if the recent 
actions (69) (see footnote) of the South African Government in 
encouraging the growth of the sporting firearms manufacturing 
69 .. Ibid P.5 (a) Footnote: The Munitions Production Act, No.87 
of 1964 as amended. This act provides for the control 
of the manufacture and supply of munitions and establishes 
a body known as the Munitions Production Board. 
(b) The armaments Development and Production Act, 
No. 57 of 1968. This Act establishes a corporation 
fof the development and production of armaments. It 
sets out the objects of this corporation and provides 
for its management and control. Tho corporation 
cannot be wound up except by or under the authority 
of an Act of Par I lament. 
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industry in this country with the subsidised establishment of 
factories for this p~rpose, and the twenty-five perceni reduction 
in price of sporting ammunition are to be taken into account 
it would appear that attempts are being made to encourage 
the shooting sports rather than curtal I them. (This development 
has, of course, a far wider reference because South Africa, 
facing as it does an official "Arms Ban" by member states of 
the United Nations Organization which affects both mi I itary and 
sporting firearms imports, has felt ·i·he need for self-su-fficiency, 
and i·he estab I i shment of factories for the manufacture of sport i n~J 
anns wou Id obv i Olis I y pay tad i ca I d Iv I dErnds In i"he sense that in 
an emergency they could very swiftly be converted for the 
manufacture of automatic ml I ltary weapons. This is mentioned to 
I I lustrate that the wider context of tho South African Government's 
actions vi s-a·-v is f i ma rms corrlTo I I aws i ~' not bu i ng co1np I cl"!·c1 I y 
ignored. Whatever the motives may be, however, the evidence at 
hand suggests that the private ownership of firearms is not under 
official attack, nor does It face further restrictions.) 
The 1969 Act retains the clause (Part I; Section 3; Para.4) 
requiring non-white applicants to receive Ministerial approval 
before I icences can be granted (I.e., from the Ministers of 
Coloured Affairs, Indian Affairs, and Bantu Administration 
for applicants of these respective population group categories), 
whereas whites do not require such po rm is~; ion. \A/hi I 0 this is 
clearly a dlscriminai·ory 1£;9211 provisi,on on the grounds of 
colour, its actual uffoct for- the differen·r population gr-oups 
in terms of the granting of I i conces is, for r·oa:?ons we sha I I 
confront below, somewhat obscure. Applications from whites 
are processed by the gathering of official information about 
each individual appl leant, some of which Is obtained from the 
Department of the Interior. Similar information regarding non-
white appl lcants Is, however, obtainable from the State 
departments 1-e I evant to the i ,- popu I ;:Ji· ion groups (as z1bove), 
and th Is perhaps accounts for the different i a I channo I I i ng 
procedures for each group. 
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However, Ministerial approval Is req~ired only for members of 
the non-white groups (whites do not need the approval of the 
Minister of the Interior), and this raises the question: Why? 
We can speculate about interesting possibilities ad infinitum 
with respect to this question without arriving at a satisf~ctory 
answering conclusion for at this stage we have no acceptable 
empirical evidence on which to base such a discussion. For 
instance, it is highly uni ikely that each and every I icence 
application is brought to the attention of the Minister himself. 
It would seem more I ikely that it is $im~ly processed through the 
Minister's department or off ice, but the impression remains that 
the Act provides for more political control over the legal 
distribution of firearms among non-whites than whites. 
There is no evidence, in law, (as opposed to pol icy) to 
indicate that different criteria are applied to the different 
groups in deciding on the suitability of individuals to possess 
firearms. One might perhaps be forgiven for assuming that, on 
theoretical grounds, the South African Government would be 
expected to encourage the arming of whites but not that of blacks 
because it rules on the authority of a majority of the former, 
but does not enjoy the formal sanction of the latter. In fact, 
one would expect that in a white minority democracy superimposed 
upon the totalitarian rule of blacks who comprise the numerical 
majority in the total population, the former woulq be armed 
and mi I itarised almost to a man, and the latter completely disarmed 
and precluded by legislation or decree from possession of dangerous 
weapons, In terms of what the law provides however, we cannot state 
that this is in fact the case. Non-whites can, and do legally 
own firearms. 
Any attempt, on the other hand, to establish empirically whether 
or not our four official population groups are, and have been 
subject to differential pol icy criteria of suitabi I ity to own 
firearms would require that the stat1stical records of all 
I icence applications over a period of years and their eventual 
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fates be carefully scrutinised. This procedure would enable the 
researcher to determine if a greater percentage of pppl ications 
from one or more population groups are eitper granted or refused. 
However, such statistical records are not avai I able in South 
Africa as a result of the structure of firearms legislatfon prior 
to 1969. No provision was made in previous gun control legislation 
for the recording of such data. As mentioned above applications 
for firearms I icences were directed to local magistrates who, 
with the recommendations of pol ice officials if cal led for, had 
to make the final decision, and these were only locally recorded. 
The establishment by the 1969 Arms and Ammunitions Act of a 
central firearms regi$ter however, is a distinctly progressive 
step in this respect because it wi I I mak~ such vital information 
genera I I y ava i I ab I e in future. 
This shifting of decision-making responsibil"ity from individual 
magistrates to the off ice of the Commissioner of Pol ice involves 
no real change in principle. Magistrates are not strictly part 
of the legal system as such, but are administrative officials 
for the law-enforcement function of the polity, as gre the 
pol ice. Appeals by citizens against decision$ of both magistrates 
and the Commissioner are not in this context dealt with by the 
Supreme or Appeal Courts of South Africa but with the relevant 
Minister and therefore the decision as to whether or not 
parsons may be grantod firearms I icences is as before administr~tive, 
and not legal. 
The extent to which the system has been centralised, however, 
is not as complete as a reading of this Act may at first suggest, 
Previously magistrates who felt unqualified to give an immediate 
decision often referred I icence applications to the local pol ice 
stations for investigation, comment, and recommendation, ~nd 
could then have something upon which to base their decisions. 
The difference introduced in the new Act is that th~ pol ice 
involvement mentioned above is now a statutory requirem9nt. 
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What has become central lsed, therefore, is not the Investigation, 
comment, and recommendation with respect to I icence applications, 
but the f lnal decision, and recording thereof. 
At the same time the actual nature of the pol ice investigation 
has not changed in any noticeable way. As before the emphasis 
is on the per-sonal particulars of the aprl leant, such 21s name, age, 
sex, occupation, address, identification number, porulation group, 
marital si-atus, purpose for which firearm is r·equirnd, pn:')vious 
record of firearms ownorship, method to be employed in securing 
firearm from poss i b I e ·fhef·I· or abuse, and whether or not the 
aprl leant is the owner of the property on which he intends ro 
keep the arm, (In cases where he is not the appl leant is required 
to produce written permission from the legal owner.) No 
attempt at th Is I oca I I eve I at I east, Is made to determ i n8 such 
information as the religion i·o which the appl icani· belongs, tho 
sorts of cultural and political or·ganizations he supports, his 
level of educational achievemeni·, r8cord of mental health, 
drinking habits etc. If such information is sought then it is 
not from the appl leant himself, nor his n8ighbours and employers, 
and It Is therefore uni ikely that it is required at al I. 
If the recommendations of the local pol ice stations ar8 to have 
the same influence under the now Act as in the pas·t, then it is 
indeed difficult to soe why the final decision whether or not a 
firearms I icence Is to be granted should I ie with the Commissioner 
who operates from the administrative capital of the country. 
Why, for instance, should the local pol ice not grant the I icence 
(as local magistrates did in the past) and then simply forward 
the particulars to Pretoria for recording in the central firearms 
register? This procedure could be adopted for al I applications, 
1vhether granted or refused, so as to reduce the burernicrai· i c 
load and simultaneously ensure adequate record-keeping so that 
future research may be more revealing and prnductive. 
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It may perhaps be that those whose task It is to decide on 
these procedures felt that, sjnce particulars provided by the 
central firearms register are necessary in deciding whether 
or not a new I icence should be granted (eg. previous record 
of firearms ownership), the final decision should rest with 
those closest to this register. On the other hand it may 
simply be a device for ensuring that one or more extra criteria 
are applied unknown to local pol ice or anybody else except the 
staff of the Commissioner's off ice, thereby bringing the system 
under more direct political control. However, in the absence 
of even the slightest shred of empirical evidence for this 
latter proposition we have perhaps to be satisfied with the 
former, i.e., that the centralization of the administration of 
firearms control laws has been motivated by bureaucratic rather 
than political, or other sectional interests. 
The evidence available, as out! ined abOV$, suggests that while 
the South African Government intends stream! ining and centralising 
legislative provisions with regard to guns, particularly with 
reference to record-keeping (which as we shal I see in the fol lowing 
chapter, has in the past left much to be desired), there is no 
'9ccompanying attempt to further I imit the (I icensed) possession 
of firearms by citizens of al I races beyond the restrictions that 
have been in force since 1937 and before. Whereas in Britain and 
the U.S.A., legislative attempts to curtai I crime have involved 
difficulties and even loss to legal gun owners, because such 
attempts were based upon the apparent assumption that the mere 
presence of firearms in society, for whatever purpose, is an 
important contributory factor in the spiral I ing rate of violent 
crime. The result was the adoption of al I- embracing restrictive 
gun laws (often against the advice of pol ice-officers) which 
have shown themselves to be completely ineffective. The South 
African Government, on the other hand, would appear to have 
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distinguished between the criminal and the legal use of firearms 
by cal I ing for the imposition of mandatory sentences for the 
former, and at the same time encouraging the latter. How 
successful this system is I lkely to be, it is too early to 
judge, but in terms of the more sophisticated premises upon 
which it is based, seems at least to hold more promise than 
would the al I-round restriction of arms possession in this 
country. 
The trend seems to indicate that there has since the early 
nineteenth century been a gradual relaxation in gun control 
legislation (excluding, obviously, the war years). As 
this short historical survey has attempted to show, the laws 
restricting firearms ownership were somewhat strict a century 
ago, particularly in the I ight of the fact that the country 
was sti I I largely undeveloped in modern terms and firearms 
were regarded as handy tools. Punishment for deviance from 
these laws was potentially harsh, while being black al I but 
defined an individual out of the field of !~gal firearms ownership~ 
The increasing sophistication of firearms laws, however, has 
been accompanied by a widening scope for potential legal gun 
ownership, particularly for the non-white groups, but has at the 
same time created problems for observers and researchers, for 
the actual pol icy appl led has become more obscure. Previous 
legislation was so worded as to make it difficult to distinguish 
it from pol icy, but such is not the case today. By opening up 
conditional possibi I ities in law the actual pol icy applied has 
become more important as a determining factor, thus making it 
more difficult for researchers to gather their required data, 
for it is easier to have access to the law than to the way in 
which it is implemented. As mentioned above, however, the 1969 
Arms and Ammunition Act has made provision for the recording of 
such critical data, and this should enable future researchers 




FIREARMS IN CRIMES; ACCIDENTS AND SUICIDES SOUTH AFRICA 
The documentary research techniques which are to be employed in 
measuring the problem of the role of firearms in crime, accidents 
and suicides in South Africa, as introduced in our first chapter 
and wiil1 the accompanying methodological conditions we have set, 
restrict us to essentially three sources of information. The 
official documents of relevance in this respect are the Report 
on Deaths, Statistics of Offences (both pub I ished from time to 
time by the Department of Statistics, Pretoria), and the Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of the South African Pol ice, pub I ished 
in Pretoria and Cape Town, and printed by the Government Printer. 
The figures supplied in these sources are, while being perhaps 
the most comprehensive and reliable among those avai I able, are 
nevertheless far from ideal. This is particularly true of the 
earlier reports consulted (i.e., from 1935 - 50) because in 
many cases they lack sufficient differentiation to be meaningful 
to this exercise. For instance, we are told (70) that in 1936 
a total of 974 people were convicted (i.e., 4 Whites, 13 Coloureds 
and 957 Bantu) for the possession of dangerous weapons, but no 
mention is made of the type of weapons involved: they could have 
been knives, pangas, guns or any other object capable of causing 
bod i I y harm. 
However, the format of these reports has evolved sufficiently 
to make recent records of more specific value. Nevertheless 
one serious problem remains with respect to the Report on Deaths, 
for no figures are supplied for the Bantu group, and, as can be 
seen from the above statistics, convictions for the possession 
of dangerous weapons have in the past involved the Bantu almost 
to the exclusion of the other groups. The 1967 report (71) 
explains this problem as fol lows, "The statistical information 
contained in this report was extracted from the 1 Form of 
Information of a Death' 8.M.0.2, filed in the off ice of the 
70. Statistics of Offences 
Dept. of Statistics; Government Printer; 1948 
71. Report on Deaths 
No. 07-03-02 
Department of Statistics;Government Printer, 1968 P.IX 
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Registrar-General .of Btrths, Marriages, and Deaths, Pretoria. 
The registration of Bantu vital events was Introduced on a 
compulsory basis many years ago. However, despite serious 
efforts on the part of the registering authorities, the Bantu 
are stil I largely reluctant to have their deaths registered 
and consequently the Department has no complete death statistics 
for this race group on a current basis". In the majority of 
cases one ought perhaps in the circumstances to react sympathetically 
to this explanation, but one wonders just how val id it can be in 
terms of deaths resulting from assaults and suicides with firearms. 
In such circumstances the onus for the official knowledge and 
recording of such information should not rest with the deceased 
individual's relatives alone, but should surely be recorded at 
least by the pol ice, for it would seem highly uni ikely that the 
pol ice are not aware of such cases. 
One among the other shortcomings has already been mentioned, i.e., 
the lack of any official recording of the number and result of 
firearms I icence applications since the introduction of the 
system. Provision has only recently been made for the collection 
of this data, and it wi I I therefore be some time before information 
regarding the distribution of firearms I icences in South African 
society wi I I be avai I able. Knowledge of such information is 
critical for a proper understanding of the role of firearms control 
laws in this society because it would reveal the actual pol icy (as 
opposed to the law) that is appl led in the granting and refusing 
of I icences. In other words, with prior knowledge of the legal 
aspects, the added knowledge of how these laws are appl led would 
reveal what the legislators intend their laws to do for them, 
for as we have said, firearms are subject to administrative and 
not legal control. 
On the other hand, knowledge of how many firearms are 
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in private possess1on in South Africa would hardly suffice as 
an indication of the actual distribution of guns in this society, 
regardless of legal considerations. This is a much more complex 
problem and wi I I obviously not be reflected in official reports. 
Statistics showing the number of convictions for thefts of firearms, 
ii legal possession of firearms, and possession of home-made 
guns provide, as we shal I see below, a solemn warning that there 
are large numbers of firearms in our society which are not legally 
registered, and that we have no way of knowing how many there 
really are, for even educated guesses are of I ittle assistance 
in this respect. 
In-depth analysis of the role of firearms 'in crime is further 
confounded by the fact that, where guns are used in the promotion 
of ii legal activities, there is no record of whether or not the 
convicted criminal was in legal possessioM·of the firearm at the 
time of the crime. Opponents of gun control legislation (viz. 
Ch.4) are I ikely to argue that this sort of information is of 
I ittle more than passing interest in any case, for whether the 
criminal has a I icence or not for the gun he uses the fact 
sti I I remains that the laws have not stopped him from using it. 
The fact that there are large numbers of i I legally held firearms 
circulating in our society, (eg. in 1971 4,406 firearms were 
reported stolen (72), and in the same year 46 home-made guns 
were confiscated in the Port Natal Division alone (73) ) is 
perhaps sufficient to justify the conclusion that many guns 
used in crime are uni icensed, and this poses the question of 
the efficacy of gun control laws in South Africa, on the same 
level as the question is posed elsewhere in the world. 
While recognising such shortcomings, however, we have nevertheless 
to proceed with the analysis of evidence which is avai I able, and 
72. The Cape Times 
Cape Town; March 10th, 1973 
73. Annual Report of the Commissioner of South African Pol ice 
Government Printer; Cape Town; 1971 
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base our acceptance or otherwise on the understanding that this 
evidence is incomplete for the Bantu group. For the White, 
Coloured, and Asiatic groups, however, where the stastical tables 
are sufficiently differentiated enough to make the figures 
meaningful in this context, they are as comprehensive as could 
possibly be extracted from any source avai I able. 
CRIME: Assaults with firearms in South Africa, for example, 
have been recorded for I ittle more than a decade. Tab le 111 
provides figures for the incidence of such assaults for al I 
but the Bantu, for the years 1962 and 1967. Figures for the 
latter year are the most recent obtainable: (74) 
TABLE 11 I 
Deaths as a Result of Assaults by Firearms 
Year Whites Coloureds Asiatics Bantu Total 
1962 24 7 3 34 
1967 33 8 2 43 
For comparative purposes Table IV is presented below, laying 
out the total murder rates for these same population groups:(75) 
TABLE IV 
Deaths as a result of Homicide and Injury Purposedly 
Other Persons .(Not in war). 
Year Whites Coloureds Asiatics 
1939 41 55 10 
1944 47 75 14 
1949 79 113 54 
1954 71 159 22 
1958 91 204 29 
1962 108 236 15 
1967 111 505 32 
74. Report on Deaths 
Dept. of Statistics; Government Printer; 
Pretoria; 1962 and 1967 
75. Ibid, 1939, 1944, 1949, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1967. 










As these tables show, of the total of 369 homicides in 1962, 
only 34 were committed with firearms, i.e~, 9,2%. By 1967, 
whereas the overal I murder rate had increased by 78 1 6%, the 
murder rate by firearms had increased only by 37,8% t9 a total 
of 43. Thus by 1967 deaths resulting from firearms assaults 
had dropped from 9,2% of the total homicides as in 196{ to 
6,64% of the total. Of the 648 homicidal deaths in 1967, o~ 
the other hand, 388 were the result of stabbing with knives and 
other cutting instruments (39 Whites, 330 Coloureds, and 19 Asiatics), 
i.e., 59,9%, as apposed to 6,64% with firearms. Knives are 
classified as dangerous weapons, as are firearms, but would appear 
in terms of these figures to constitute a far greater threat to 
pub I i c safety. 
The greater prevalence of knives and associated cutting instrum~nts 
in murder cannot be simply attributed to the fact that firearms 
are subject to stricter administrative control, for as the 
fol lowing table (Table V) demonstrates large numbers of firearms 
are held in the society in defiance of the I icensing laws. 
This particular table presents figures for convictions far the 
i I legal possession of firearms, which by their very nature are 
offennes that are always l~ss observable than murders, for instance, 
and therefore present q much less reliable index of the actual rate 
of such offences. These figures are extracted from Statistics of 
Offences (76) which, uni ike the Report on Deaths, includes 
information of Bantu involvement. 
TABLE V 
Convictions for the i I legal possession of Firearms 
Year Whites Coloureds Asiatics Bantu Total 
1936 136 7 10 176 329 
1949 679 90 100 603 1,472 
1954 567 118 77 729 I, 491 
1958 565 112 42 875 I, 591 
1962 500 85 54 970 1,609 
76. Statistics of Offences 
Dept. of Statistics; Government Printer; Pretoria; 
1936; 1949; 1954; 1958; 1962. 
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In 1965/66 (i.e., from the beginning of July 1965 to the 
end of June 1966) there were a total of 232 convictions for the 
theft of firearms (25 Whites and 207 non-Whites) (77). In the 
same year there were a total of 4,905 robbery convictions, 63 
of which involved robbery by force of arms and during which 23 
firearms were looted (78). In 1967/8 the convictions for the 
theft of firearms had dropped to 176 (i.e., 21 Whites, 18 Coloureds, 
2 Asiatics and 135 Bantu). Convictions for such offences, however, 
as noted above, do not represent a reliable index for firearms 
thefts as a whole. For example in 1970/71, of the 4,405 firearms 
reported lost or stolen to the poi ice, a total of 588 were recovered, 
meaning that in al I I ikel ihood the majority of the remaining 3818 
are in uni icensed and therefore ii legal hands. (79) 
Among the operative possibilities, for instance, it is quite plausible 
that many people from whom firearms are stolen or who otherwise lose 
them, are not sure of exactly how they come to be missing. For 
example, it is not uncommon for individuals to keep pistols in the 
glove-compartments of their motor-cars and not to keep regular 
checks on their presence. The car may often spend time in garages 
undergoing servicing etc., and the result is that when the car-owner 
finally discovers that his gun is not where it should be he Is at 
a loss as to how and why. There are many such possibilities, 
together with the probability that many such gun-owners do not 
report the loss of their firearms to the pol ice in the hope that 
they may sometime suddenly appear, or in the fear that they would 
either be prosecuted for neg I igence, or that such a loss would 
prejudice future I icence applications. 
There is I ittle doubt, therefore, that in South Africa there 
are large numbers of firearms in the hands of people who do not 
enjoy official sanction, and the possibility of these firearms being 
used in the commission of crimes is greatly increased if, as alleged 
the majority of missing guns are stolen, for they are then by 
definition already in the hands of criminals. 
77. Ibid, 1967 
78. The Annual Report of the Commissioner of the South African Pol ice 
Government Printer; Pretoria; 1966. 
79. Ibid, 1971 • 
95. 
Disturbing as the above figures may be though, it is perhaps 
wel I to compare them with the fact that in 1969/70 the reported 
number of convictions for the possession of dangerous weapons, 
specifically excluding firearms, was 20, 961, and in 1970/71 
the figure rose to 21, 841, constituting an 880 rise (80), 
(These figures being subject to the same conditions as those 
for firearms I isted above). 
In terms of the total number of convictions for the possession 
of al I types of dangerous weapons we may then quite satisfactorily 
conclude that firearms play a minimal role. That f lrearms are 
aval I able i I legally and for criminal purposes the above figures 
should not leave us In doubt, and in addition, we have good 
reason to bel I eve that I I legally held firearms stand a better 
chance of being involved in criminal activities than I lcensed 
arms, and as a result we have no grounds on which to assume 
that the enactment of laws restricting the ownership of firearms 
as one type of dangerous weapon, whether as presently constituted 
or not, has any signif lcant effect on their prevalance in crime. 
The figures aval I able seem to support the same conclusions as 
those drawn In Chapter 4 with respect to Britain and the U.S.A., 
i.e., that there is no direct and measurable relqtionship between 
the presence of firearms in society and their use In crime 
on the one hand, and the adoption of restrictive firearms 
legislation and crime statistics on the other. 
ACCIDENTS 
With respect to accidents with firearms resulting In death or 
injury, however, the I ink between the two variables (i.e., 
the operation of f lrearms control laws and accidental f lrearms deaths) 
wou Id appear to be even more obscure. If gun I eg is I at ion does 
not stop people from possessing uni icensed firearms then it is 
hardly I ikely to effect accident rates caused by guns. 
Deaths (not injuries) resulting from accidents caused by firearms 
are presented in figure-form in Table VI. Again, these figures 
are extracted from the Report on Deaths (81 ), and therefore none 
for the Bantu group are avai I able. 
80. Ibid; 197 I 
81. Report on Deaths 
Department of Statistics,Government Printer, Pretoria 
1949, 1954, 1958, 1959, 1962, 1967. 
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TABLE VI 
Deaths resulting from Accidents caused by Firearms 
Year Whites Coloured Asiatica Bantu Total 
1949 50 3 53 
1954 32 0 32 
1958 27 0 27 
1959 18 4 22 
1962 45 5 50 
1967 35 5 40 
No interpretation of these figures could possibly lead to 
the suggestion that the ownership of firearms constitutes a major 
exposure to the risk of accidental death in our society. 
Moreover, one suspects that these figures may in fact not 
be presenting the true picture in the sense that in cases 
where suicide is strongly suspected, but not proved to legal 
satisfaction, accidental deaths may be recorded. This means 
that short of conducting a thorough investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding each "accident" (more thorough, that is, 
than the Coroner's inquiry) we have no way of knowing exactly 
how many firearms deaths are directly attributable to error. 
In spite of this, figures for deaths resulting from firearms 
accidents are low. Compare them, for example, with the fact that 
in 1967 there were a total (excluding Bantu) of 2,450 deaths 
as a result of motor accidents (i.e., 1,417 Whites, 861 Coloureds, 
172 Asiatics) (82). There are two important aspects to this 
comparison which deserve attention: firstly it is accepted that 
because of our peculiar socio-historical and cultural situation 
individuals in our society are exposed to the possibility of motor 
accidents far more than firearms accidents, and secondly that in 
many cases the probabi I ity exists that the cause of such accidents 
lay in the negligence in some form or other of a I icensed driver 
of a motor vehicle. The first point should serve as sufficient 
justification for treating the consideration of this problem with 
82 . I b i d; I 96 7 
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the urgency it requires, and the second point should cause us to 
focus a I ittle more critically on the I icencing procedures undergone 
by the drivers of motor vehicles. 
We are aware that in most parts of South Africa al I ·applicants for 
driver's I icences are required by law to successfully complete a 
test for a learner's I icence by indicating an acceptable acquaintance 
with the rules and road signs by which motorized traffic is regulated. 
They then have to be taught and accompanied by a I icensed driver, 
before finally undergoing a test of proficiency with a vehicle and 
having their performance examined by a representative of the relevant 
traffic department. No attempt is made, uni ike firearms I icence 
applications, to determine whether or not the prospective driver 
is I ikely to display a responsible attitude in his relationship 
with his vehicle, nor is there any legal difference ( such as 
ministerial approval) for the separate ethnic groups written into 
the law governing motor vehicle I icences. 
Without suggesting that the State should introduce I icensing 
procedures for firearms involving tests of proficiency, safety 
habits, and hand I ing ethtcs , (the above figures would hardly 
justify such a suggestion), it is nevertheless noteworthy 
that, on an official level, absolutely no attempt is made to establish 
whether or not a firearms applicant is acquainted with general safety 
techniques, let alone the peculiar mechanical features of the gun 
he wishes to possess. Nor is it sufficient to assume that any 
young man who has undergone mi I itary training or who has served 
in the pol ice force is thereby suitably equipped, for these forces 
use only I imited types of firearms. Safety requirements differ so 
extensively within and between such categories as bolt-action, 
pump-action, lever-action, semi-automatic and single-shot rifles, 
for instance, that knowledge of how to handle one gun safely is no 
guarantee whatsoever that he can handle al I with impunity. For 
example, a pol iceman who is used to toting a double-action 
revolver on duty, and who is therefore accustomed to loading al I 
six chambers may wel I find if he buys a single-action revolver 
that this procedure can be fatal. Instructions are seldom 
included with the purchase (particularly if second-hand), 
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and he may not find out until it ls too late. Guns and motor 
vehicles can both be lethal instruments and both require that 
the owner and user be· I icensed, but curiously enough there exist 
fundamental differences in the I icensing procedures for reasons 
which are extremely difficult to determine. 
While figures for deaths caused by firearms accidents 
may not justify the status of a social problem, they nevertheless 
remain a problem in the sense that they involve unnecessary loss 
·of I ife, and therefore any attempt to develop an educative 
pol icy with regard to firearms use would be much more purposeful 
than current I icensing procedures. As mentioned above the 
suggestion is not here being made that these procedures should 
be changed to those similar for motor-car I icences because 
so many people evidently possess uni icensed guns that it is not 
I ikely to significantly affect accident statistics. It would 
be far more productive in this respect for officialdom to encourage 
members of society to respect potentially dangerous objects I ike cars 
and guns, regardless of whether these individuals actually legally 
own such objects. (One thinks immediately, in this context, of the 
possibi I ity of teaching school-children undergoing cadet training-
as the vast majority appear to do - of the basic "golden rules" 
relative to the handling of firearms). The same is true of 
other comparative examples of accidental loss of I ife. Electrocution, 
for instance, accounted for 53 accidental deaths in 1967 (40 Whites, 
12 Coloureds, 1 Asiatic) (83), which ls somewhat higher than the 
annual average of shooting accidents and which also represents a 
problem that could wet I benefit from an educative approach, rather 
than requiring people to apply for I icences to use electricity. 
A more serious problem than either of the above (i.e., firearms 
ace i dents and e I ectrocut ion) is that of ace i denta I drowning. In 
the year under review, 1967, there were a total of 473 such deaths 
83. Ibid, 1967 
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( 137 Whites, 302 Coloureds, and 34 Asiatics) (84). Swimmers 
are not required by law to be I icensed, and to suggest that they 
should be would obviously be absurd, for unless a highly elaborate 
training programme is included it is highly uni ikely that there 
would be a significant drop in these figures. Clearly, I icensing 
procedures similar in principle to those required under the 
Arms and Ammunition Act would have no affect whatsoever. 
We are l.ed by this analysis to the same conclusion as that reached 
with reference to crime and firearms control. As with crime, 
we can estab I i sh no direct relationship between the enactment 
of firearms laws in our society and the figures for accidental 
deaths as a result of the possession of guns. The very structure 
of firearms control legislation in South Africa does not display 
any evidence of direction against firearms accidents, in comparison 
with motor vehicle I icencing, which requires the successful 
completion of a test of proficiency by the applicant. Accidental 
firearms deaths, therefore, cannot be said to enjoy the attention 
of legislators, perhaps because, as we have seen above, the incidence 
is low, and as a result cannot be included in the role of gun control 
laws in this country. 
SUICIDES 
Deaths as a result of self-inf I icted injury with firearms are 
presented below (Table VI I) (85). As with Table I I I, records have 
not been kept long enough to enable the presentation of a more 
comprehensive table. 
TABLE VI I 















Records of suicides from al I causes have been kept for considerably 
longer, and for purposes of comparison some of these figures are 
presented in Table VI 11 (86) 
84. Ibid; 196 7. 
85. lbib; 1962, 1967. 
86. Ibid; 1939, 1944, 1949, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1967. 
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TABLE VI I I 
Deaths as a result of 'Suicides from al I Causes 
Year Whites Coloureds. Asiatics Bantu Total 
1939 240 17 25 282 
1944 163 23 25 211 
1949 291 26 37 354 
1954 310 32 44 386 
1958 374 42 37 453 
1962 536 71 44 651 
1967 497 83 56 636 
Firearms qwite evidently play a far more significant role in 
suicides for these three population groups than either crime or 
accidents. In each of the above recorded cases firearms accounted 
for roughly a third of the total, but this can hardly suffice as an 
argument in favour of restrictive gun legislation. A suicide 
is by definition a deliberate act which can be achieved through 
a great many means, some of which may be significantly more 
effective than many firearms currently in circulation. The 
presence or absence of a firearm is therefore clearly inconsequential, 
for it is uni ikely in the extreme that anybody has even been deterred 
from taking his own I ife simply because he did not have a gun 
avai I able. That firearms control laws are not designed to combat 
suicides seems quite obvious. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis of the avai I able statistics would appear to indicate 
that many thousands of uni icensed firearms are held in South Africa 
regardless of laws to the contrary, a great proportion of which 
have been stolen (and are thereby already criminally involved), 
some home-made, and many others no doubt purchased on a flourishing 
black-market. 
In spite of this, as the official figures show, firearms do not 
play a major role in homicides for the White, Coloured, and 
Asiatic groups, but what is even more important is the fact that 
the absence of firearms in the majority of cases has not prevented 
the committal of murders. Knives and other cutting instruments 
account for more than half the annual number of homicides, and 
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while they are classified also as dangerous weapons they are 
subject to little more than nominal administrative control, in 
comparison with the elaborate bureaucratic measures established 
for gun control. 
Our discussion of the involvement of guns in accidental deaths 
and suicides has also indicated that the presence or absence of 
firearms control laws cannot be expected to influence annual 
statistical returns under these headings, and we are therefore 
led by this analysis to place a prominent question mark behind 
the whole concept of restrictive firearms control laws in this 
country. 
If we were to argue that the reason for the fact that firearms 
are stil I involved in many cases of violent crime (albeit a minor 
involvement) because the private ownership of guns has not been 
completely banned, and in order to solve the problem programmes 
of total confiscation by the State should be developed, how much 
closer would this bring us to a solution? In terms of the 
empJtical evidence our answer to this question would have to 
be unequivocally negative. In fact, such a total banning 
policy would, if anything, lead further away from any solution 
simply because we cannot accept that the members of our society 
who presently hold uni icensed firearms are I ikely to surrender 
them at the nearest pol ice-station if this pol icy became law. 
Mr. J.J.M. Stephens (U.P.Floride) was aware of precisely this 
point when in March 1973 (87) he introduced a private members 
motion in the House of Assembley requesting the Government to 
act against the alarming increase in gang activities. He argued 
that the Cape of Good Hope had become the Cape of Fear, particularly 
in the non-white townships, where the problem had reached crisis 
proportions. Youth gangs, growing in numbers, roamed the streets 
and terrorized the residents, and in spite of the I icensing laws, 
these gangs managed to obtain firearms. He cal led for an immediate 
study in order to ascertain where the problem lay. 
87. The Cape Times 
Cape Town; March 10th, 1973. 
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We have to accept that firearms wi I I contfnuo to be held by 
those individuals who do not feel the need to conform to society's 
laws as much as others, and therefore the legislative attempt to 
confiscate al I firearms would clearly lead to a situation in 
which only the lawless would be armed with guns, whereas those who 
respect and abide by the law would be necessarily disarmed and 
thus defenseless, let alone deprived of the right to use guns 
for the numerous sporting purposes to which they are popularly put. 
Legislation aimed at the total confiscation of al I privately owned 
firearms would therefore defeat rather than serve the ends for 
which it (as we have defined it) is designed. 
However, without the present system of gun control legislation, 
we may ask, accepting its shortcomings, would the crime rate 
not be higher? This is an empirical question requiring statistical 
information on the prevalence of I icensed and uni icensed firearms 
in crime. This information is presently not avai I able in South 
Africa, but as we have noted earlier in this chapter, the indications 
are that the vast number of firearms annually reported missing 
are actually stolen, and therefore are at least as I ikely as any 
to become involved in further criminal acts. In any case, as 
the figures show, by far the majority of homicides are carried 
out with dangerous weapons other than firearms, more than half 
of which are knives and other cutting instruments. Johan Beyers, 
the Argus Crime Reporter claims (88) that according to pol ice 
officers in the Cape Town area guns are very rarely used in crime 
and that "popular weapons include pangas, knives, bottles, bricks, 
sticks, garden implements (such as spades, forks and picks), 
empty buckets and buckets of boi I ing water, stones, hammers and 
axes", and that very often the murderer and his victim are both 
under the influence of I iquor or dagga. We cannot say that 
the presence or absence of firearms control laws (as much as 
dagga control laws) has any affect whatsoever on the murder rate. 
If the high rate of violent crime deserves treatment as a social 
problem in South Africa, its treatment wi I I not be met with 
88. The Argus 
Cape Town; 24th March 1973; P.9 
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success by looking for short-term solutions and what must amount 
to criminological ly naive overs Imp I if ications. Crime, and 
particularly violent crime, involves very much more than the 
private possession of firearms, and the restriction on their 
possessiof1 to only "fit and proper persons" neither lessens 
the crime rate, nor does it make the attacks on innocent 
people less deadly. As sociologists we should know that the 
etiology of crime I !es in a whole array of interrelated social 
factors, and if legislation Is to play its integrative role in 
society then it should be aimed at restricting these factors, 
rather than acting against the possession of the weapons which may 
sometimes be used. By adopting this latter course of action one 
adversely affects law-abiding citizens for whom guns may mean 
many different things. We cannot justify gun control legislation 
with the assertion that guns are the tools of criminals, for so 
are "getaway cars", gloves, and oxy-acetylene torches. They are 
also the tools of law-enforcement officers, mi I itary people, 
sportsmen, and private individuals who have the right to defend 
their I ives and property as effectively as possible when these 
are under unlawful attack. 
To further ii lustrate this point we may note that the U.S.A's 
F.B. I. has compiled a 1.ist (89) of major crime variables, and 
the eleven factors considered to be the most important are: 
(I~ "Density and size of the community population and the 
major metropolitan area of which it is a part". 
(I I) "Composition of the population with reference particularly 
to age, sex, and race". 
(I I I) "Economic status and mores of the population". 
(IV) "Relative stabi I ity of the population, including commuters, 
seasonal, and other transient types". 
(V) "Climate, including seasonal and weather conditions". 
(VI) "Educational, recreational, and religious characteristics". 
89. Guns 
Pub I isher 1s Development Corp: I I I inois: June 1972, P.5 






"Effective. strength of the po I ice force". 
"Standards governing appointments to the po I ice force". 
11 Po I i c i es of the prosecuting off i c i a Is and of the courts". 
11 Attitude of the pub I ic toward law enforcement problems". 
"The administrative and investigative efficiency of the 
local law enforcement agency, including the degree of 
adherence to crime reporting standards". 
Clearly, the private possession of firearms is not considered 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be of significant 
relevance to the crime rate. There exists a wide range of 
contingencies threatening harmonious social relationships, 
which deserve our urgent attention if the problems of increasing 
social disintegration are to be successfully dealt with. 
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CHAPTER 7 
. IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES 
If this research study has led to the acceptable conclusion that 
there is no relationship between crime, accident, and suicide rates 
on the one hand, and the presence or absence of firearms control 
legislation on the other, then we are inevitably confronted with 
the problem of explaining why the private possession of guns 
is subject to legislative control at al I in this country. 
It would appear that essentially two possibi I ities present 
themselves for speculation in this context. The first I ies in 
the fact that, uni ike the U.S.A., South Africa has not 
experienced a tradition of constitutionally guaranteed free 
gun ownership. In America (with 1 the notable exception of the 191 I 
Sul I ivan Act of New York) laws which have been introduced to restrict 
firearms possession, such as the Gun Control Act of 1968, have only 
really gained significant support during the last decade, particularly 
those motivated (on the surface, at least) in the name of crime control. 
The issue has been, and remains a highly contentious one that is 
subject to a continued pub I ic debate, the battle I ines are drawn, 
and the popular perspectives wel I pub I icised. 
In South Africa, on the other hand, it would probably 
be fair to say that firearms contro I I aws in some form or other 
have existed for so long now that nobody really knows what purpose they 
are designed to serve. The "necessity" for such laws would simply 
seem to be assumed in terms of such variables as pub I ic safety and 
civi I peace, etc., and while they are tinkered with from time to 
time, stream I ined, overhauled or whatever, there is nowhere any 
noticeable attempt to justify their presence in principle on the 
Statute Books, let alone to critically examine their efficacy. 
The second possibi I ity may I ie in the al legation that the 
zealous attempts of successive South African governments 
to maintain what is functionally harmonious in the system 
have led to the deliberate restriction on the private possession 
of firearms in an attempt to ensure that political change 
is channel led only through the constitutionally approved 
ballot-box or lobby, rather than democratically less orthodox means. 
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At its most extreme such a policy would Imply that a Leninist 
approach (see Chapter 3) of arming only the "right11 people is 
applied, and that important qua I ifying criteria for the status of 
a "fit and proper person" would include Party membership, 
racial origin, religious bellets, trustworthy loyalty, and family 
connections, etc. Taken to its logical conclusion such an extreme 
position is symptomatic of a Marxist interpretation of legislation 
as being one method for the maintenance of existing power relations 
in society. 
While the Parsonian definition of law (90) as "that aspect 
of the machinery for the definition and implementation of 
institutional norms which I inks legitimation through authoritative 
i nterp retat ion with app I i cation and. enforcement by po I it i ca I agency" 
may create the potential for a political interpretation (for 
whatever motives) of law as a method for ensuring that political 
change which is normatively institutionalised through the ballot-box 
or lobby is legally enforced through the same means, it does not 
authorize the arming of loyalists only, for one of the fundamental 
provisions of this definition is that the content of legislation 
must be dictated by prevai I ing institutionalised norms, and not 
vice versa (we are not here denying that under exceptional 
circumstances, such as times of great social crises and civi I wars,etc., 
governments may legitimately suspend the democratic process and 
impose martial law, but such action is taken on the understanding 
that martial law, while it greatly increases the administrative 
power of key politicians, is not the ideal state of affairs and 
a return to "normal" democratic I ife must be made as soon as possible.) 
Our discussion in Chapter 5 of the procedures for firearms 
I icence applications in S.A. rules out the possibi I ity of a 
Marxist legislative framework in this respect, for as we 
saw, the abovementioned qua I ifying criteria are not relevant in any 
way. The Government has in the majority of cases no way of 
knowing the voting preferences of I icence applicants, nor does 
it seek such information. 
90. Parsons, T. Structure and Process in Modern Societies 
Free Press; I I I i no is; 1960; P. 190 
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On the other hand, the peculiar political divisions which characterise 
South African society, (i.e., a white democracy with the simultaneous 
total ltarian rule of blacks) al lows for the theoretical proposition 
In terms of the analytlcal framework that only the whites are armed, 
but the blacks not. Applylng this proposition to the emplrical 
test, however, we note that while statistical information on the 
offlclal responses to I icence applications of the different races 
Is not yet aval I able, and that in terms of the operative Act non-
whites require Ministerial approval for firearms I lcences and whites 
do not, the fact remains that citizens of al I races can 
and do legally possess firearms irrespective of political or religious 
considerations. This emphasises the fact that although the 
non-white population groups have no direct political power in 
the.sense in which the concept is democratically understood, the 
assumption that they therefore represent an opposing pol ltical 
force is a theoretical one and one which as a result of the 
structural situation in which it is found, is lacking in signif lcant 
empirical content. Blacks have not yet had the opportunity to 
representatively demonstrate in a quantitative way (I .e.,voting) 
just how they respond to the present methods by which they are 
ruled. Perhaps, we may speculate, the Administration believes 
that the majority of people ruled in this way do in fact support 
the system, or in the absence of consensus, at least do not represent 
a violent threat to it, and therefore does not object to their 
ownership of f lrearms, but at the same time requires them to seek 
Ministerial approval as a "just in case" measure. 
We are therefore faced with alternatlve theoretical propositions 
and scanty empirical i~put for comparative purposes. The facts, 
however, that prior to 1969 no central recording machinery for 
firearms I icences existed, and that citizens of al I races continue 
to be granted these I lcences without reference to pol ltical or 
rel iglous convictions should serve to discount the former, and 
as a result we are led to the conclusion that it is more I ikely 
that the reason for the persistence of such laws in our society 
I ies firstly in the lack of empirlcal evidence either In support of 
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or opposition to them, secondly In the failure of the Executive to 
(i.e., prior to 1969) set about methodically collecting relevant 
data, and thirdly in the accompanying assumption that the 
existence of gun control laws, being an historical fact, (i.e., 
part of our traditional way of I ife) 'is th13refore justified as an 
integrating mechanism in our society. 
Our failure to empirically relate crime, accident and suicide 
variables to firearms legislation presents us with these two 
possibi I ities. If neither of them are in fact operative, 
then we have been led into a logical cul-de-sac and are completely 
at a loss to explain the existence of :;;uch legislation. Nor can 
we accept at this level that it is a combination of the two because 
they are in principle highly uni ikely bedfellows - involving as they 
do f undamenta I i ncompat i bi I it i es. 
In terms of the evidence we have to accept that the laws 
are maintained because they are believed tq be useful conformance 
techniques in pursuit of social equi I ibrium, a belief based on 
assumption and acclaim, rather than sound scientific grounds. 
This finding is consistent with that of Greenwood's (91) in 
relation to the same problem in Britain. 
If legislation is to be bui It 6n empirical foundations, a 
necessity indicated by the foregoing analysis, then in terms of 
firearms we have clearly to seek alternative policies to enable 
the laws to play their defined role. In other words, a pol icy 
is required which guarantees law-abiding citizens the right to 
keep and bear arms for sporting and defence purposes, and which 
at the same time deters deviants from using dangerous weapons 
for criminal purposes. 
The role of legislation generally in terms of deterrent effect 
would seem to be popularly discredited in current theoretical 
approaches, (92) at least with reference to emphasis, and without 
91. Greenwood, C. 
92. Toby, J. 
Firearms Control -----··----
Routledge & Kegan Paul; London; 1972 
Contemporary Soc~~!.z'.:. 
John \!Ji ley; N.Y. 1964 P.485 
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indulging in a protracted abstract analytical discussion of the 
issues involved in this position we submit that there is sufficient 
evidence presented in this study to justify the conclusion that 
the presence of restrictive gun laws in this country has not 
deterred many thousands of people from keeping and bearing 
uni icensed firearms. The imp I ication here is clear that legislators 
should lay greater stress on the right of private individuals 
to own guns for lawful purposes, rather than enact laws which 
result in the disarming of peaceful citizens, while the lawless 
remain armed. 
Firearms may no longer have the essential qua I ity, in contemporary 
society, of being an absolute need for the gathering of sustenance 
and for self and home defense as they did in the days of'the 
pioneers, but we cannot accept that they are therefore no 
longer needed at al I for protective and legitimate sporting purposes. 
It is not sufficient, as we have noted, to point out that increasing 
social differentiation characteristic of modernization has led to 
the emergence of specialist structures such as pol ice forces (which 
are themselves subject to further differentiation into even more 
specialist categories, eg. Drug Squad, Murder and Robbery Squad, 
Vice Squad, Commercial Branch etc.) and that anyone who feels threatened 
may simply apply for pol ice protection. Such an analysis, while 
it may have sound theoretical and empirical support, is hardly 
of significant comfort to the unfortunate bank-teller staring down 
the business-end of a "sawed-off" shotgun; and even less comfort to 
the man whose family and property may be threatened by a wel I-armed 
nocturnal intruder. The analysis is clearly not accompanied by any 
rationale to justify the disarming of the citizenry, any more than 
the establishment of an impersonal rule of law in modern societies 
precludes the right of individuals, in the absence of alternatives, 
to return violence with violence in the defence of their own I Ives. 
While the South African legislature shows at this stage no signs 
of changing or even questioning the I icensing requirements of 
firearms owners, some of the legislation adopted within the last 
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decade has been distinctly encouraging in terms of the cal I for 
an increased emphasis on the right to keep and bear arms. In 
1964, 1968 and 1969 Acts were passed which among other things 
respectively established local faci I ities for the production of 
sporting arms and ammunition (thereby indicating that the 
legitimate use of firearms was to be promoted rather than threatened), 
provided for severe mandatory sentences for the unlawful use of 
firearms (thereby simultaneously attempting to deter deviant elements 
within society from criminally abusing guns), and established the 
Central Firearms Register (thereby ensuring that any future firearms 
legislation could be empirically prompted through the avai labi I ity 
of organized and up-to-date statistical information). As mentioned 
above~ this cannot be taken to indicate that the principle of 
restrictive firearms control laws is in question ~t the political 
level in South Africa. On the contrary, it would appear that the 
belief in the "necessity" for gun control, especially of the "you can't 
have every Tom, Dick and Harry running around with a gun" kind remains 
very strong indeed, and may wel I be the initiating force behind 
particularly the Central Firearms Register. What it does serve to 
indicate, however, is that there is a questioning of current methods 
together with an approach which is apparently becoming increasingly 
receptive to empirical evidence. 
Legislators should be urged - if they wish their laws to play 
. 
their defined integrative role as a functional imperative 
of the system - to base their legislation on empirical needs 
rather than on khadi-type value judgments and untested pre-
suppositions. The need for empirically motivated legislation is 
ever increasing in view of the rapidly developing technological 
characteristics of our society, and al I the concomitants of 
modernization, particularly those of urbanization and social 
heterogeneity. 
The ramifications of this position point to the needed 
emphasis on the gathering in the Central Firearms Register of 
as much evidence as could conceivably be of relevance in providing 
I I I~ 
objective information of use to scholars, researchers and legislators 
attempting to critically evaluate presently accepted firearms laws. 
If the results of this new commitment to objectivity include the 
awakening to the empirical non sequiturs of prevai I ing beliefs 
and assumptions together with their jettisoning in the face of 
sound evidence, so much the better, for in terms of our methodological 
position outlined at the beginning of this study this is an experience 
which is not only an occupational hazard, but also a scientifically 
encouraging one. 
We have noted on previous occasions that the 1969 Arms and 
Ammunition Act provides for the collection of data critical 
to the analysis of the role of firearms control laws in South African 
society, and that as a result future research into the problem may 
be expected to be both more revealing and productive. If 
future research confirms and strengthens the findings of this study 
then, in cal I ing for an increased emphasis on the individual right 
to keep and bear arms as an empirically determined alternative 
to the more simplistic legislative measures at present assumed to 
be necessary for keeping the peace, we have to confront the 
problem of establishing what the practical imp I ications of 
such a pol icy may be expected to be. What are the advantages 
and disadvantages, for example, of a system of completely 
free gun ownership? Is a so~iety of gun-toting individuals 
desireable? Looked at in isolation and measured only against 
our abstract value system the answer is obviously negative. But 
we do not I ive in isolation. We I ive in a complex social 
. 
situation in which guns are carried not only in defiance of the 
law but also in defiance of our value system itself, and therefore 
a pol icy of completely free gun ownership would at this level 
be preferable to a restrictive one in the sense that it would 
permit the constituents to defend themselves, the law, and the 
value system with potentially equal efficacy. The fact that 
such a pol icy represents I ittle more than the potential for the 
above is because the question of whether or not it wi I I result 
in every citizen suddenly going out and buying a gun is an 
empirical one, but if nothing else it would obviate the fruitless 
administrative difficulties encountered under the prevai I ing 
II 2. 
legislative provisions which serve to discourage applicants to 
such an extent that only reasonably determined individuals are 
prepared to suffer them. 
On the other hand it would be disadvantageous to advocate the 
removal of the present gun control system if such action would 
simultaneously lead to the loss of the recently established 
data gathering provisions, thereby subverting the possibi I ity 
of future research into the problem. This issue can be 
resolved, however, if future research confirms these findings 
to the satisfaction of !aw-makers and the right to keep and 
bear arms becomes the focus of po~itive legislation, for the 
data gathering energies could then be harnessed for more useful 
research aimed at the reduction and eventual disappearance of 
the social factors related to the situations in which violent 
crime is found. 
Further research featuring information provided by the Central 
Firearms Register (when it becomes avai I able) is clearly necessary 
before any specific cal I for legislative action by Par I lament 
can be fully justified. Nevertheless a number of conclusions 
emerge from the study, some of which have already been discussed, 
and which we feel justified in accepting on the evidence presented. 
On the general level it would appear to have been satisfactorj ly 
demonstrated that legislators need to acknowledge thqt laws should 
be based on empirical !y derived requirements rather than untested 
assumptions, and that on these grounds firearms control laws in 
particular are questionable in principle. 
We would consider these findings as sufficient foundation for 
arguing in favour of a shift of emphasis from restriction to 
freedom with respect to the right to own firearms for legitimate 
purposes,particularly with respect to I ifting the heavy bureaucratic 
II 3. 
load caused by the present system off the shoulders of pol ice 
officers and the pub I ic. Further than that it is perhaps unwise 
for a sociologist to attempt to venture, for the problem of 
actually designing legislation requires learned specialists. 
The sociologist may assist in advising the law-maker on 
where to aim his laws and what role they should be designed 
to play (which we feel we have done in regard to firearms 
control laws), but to go further than that would be to tread 




SUMMARY AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In attempting to establish the role played by firearms control 
legislation in South African society a methodological position 
was adopted in terms of which social research of this nature 
is considered equivalent to natural research - i ,e., subject 
to scientific theoretical frameworks, data producing and 
gathering techniques, and analytical procedures. 
It was felt from the outset that only by employing the objective 
methods of observation, analysis, and verification can empirical 
work in the social sciences serve its fundamental purpose -
that of providing general explanations of social processes in 
terms of scientific causality - by adding to mankind's store 
of knowledge in as many fields as possible. 
At the theoretical level the social system to be studied 
was defined in Parsonian terms, involving therefore the structural-
functional aspects of the concepts thus defined. Such a general 
theoretical scheme was considered necessary because it provides 
for general explanations of a meaningful kind to be extracted 
from fragmented empirical research projects, thereby rendering 
such projects more useful in terms of the advancement of knowledge. 
The focus of the study was then telescoped to the more specific 
areas with which this exercise was to deal, i.e., the soci9logy of 
law, criminology, and social legislation. In terms of the 
' 
analytical framework, legislation was then defined as serving 
the integrative i~perative of the system. 
Some general historical perspectives relating to the relationship 
between polity and individual citizen with respect to the private 
possession of arms were discussed with particular reference to 
administrative attempts on the part of the polity to restrict the 
individual avai labi I ity of weapons. Firearms were developed as 
efficient tools soon after the dawn of the technological age, and 
with the accompanying urban problems of modernization they became 
subject to increasingly severe restrictions with regard 
to lawful ownership. 
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The fol lowing discussion of contemporary perspectives revealed 
that although such restrictions remain in force today in most 
societies, and in most cases are assumed to serve 1-he integrative 
imperative by I imiting the avai labi I ity of guns to criminals, this 
assumption is not empirically supported. Greenwood (93) has shown 
convincingly that in Britain the gun control laws in operation 
have not provided the slightest evidence that they are even 
remotely connected with violent crime rates. Other authors 
cited in Chapter 4 have argued with similar conviction that 
firearms legislation (such as the notorious Sul I ivan Law of 
New York) serves more to defeat the purposes for which it is 
designed than to promote them, because they simply do not keep 
guns out of the hands of criminals, and therefore their only 
effective achievement is to hinder law-abiding people who wish to 
possess firearms for numerous purposes. 
A brief historical survey of gun control in South Africa preceded 
on analysis of the role of firearms in crime, accidents and 
suicides in this society. Documentary evidence was extracted from 
the official reports of the Department of Statistics (i.e., the 
Report on Deaths, and Statistics of Offences) and the Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of the South African Pol ice in 
order to establish the role of current firearms legislation 
in relation to these variables. 
The results of this study may be brought together and 
summarised as fol lows; 
South African firearms legislation has existed for 
many years on the assumption that it plays a useful 
integrative role in society. No empirical evidence is 
avai I able to support this assumption. On the contrary, 
what evidence is avai I able points to the irrelevance of 
these laws when measured against their purpose. 
93. Greenwood, C. Firearms Control 
Routledge and Kegan Paul; London; 1972 
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As a result of these findings the fol_lowing points are suggested; 
( i) Legislation which is aimed at influencing variables 
such as crime and social disintegration (the etiology of 
which are not yet fully understood) should not be based 
on unfounded assumptions alone. Where empirical evidence 
is not available it should be sought. At the same time 
legislative efforts in this context should be continually 
subject to objective tests of efficacy, in order that 
they may serve changing demands. 
(ii) Legislators should lay positive stress on the right 
of individuals to keep and bear arms for legitimate 
sporting and defense purposes, and support mandatory 
sentences for the i I legal use of dangerous weapons. 
( i i i ) 
( In re I at ion to the I atter ca I I it is here conceded that 
the South African Government has already instituted such 
mandatory prison sentences in terms of the 1968 Dangerous 
Weapons Act). 
The administrative burden on pol ice and citizens caused 
by the present provisions for firearms I icence appl !cations 
should be significantly eased; and if future research of 
a more comprehensive nature confirms these findings, these 
procedures should be completely removed from operation. 
(iv) To enable future research to be more productive the 
fol lowing should be included with the information recorded 
in the Central Firearms Register (i.e., besides the data 
already gathered) : 
(a) the number of I icence applications granted and refused 
for each population group category annually, together 
with reasons for refusals; 
(b) the number of firearms in legal (and i I legal) possession 
of convicted criminals at the time of the offences by 
virtue of which they were convicted, together with a 
description of each gun involved (i.e., type, make 
calibre, etc). 
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(c) the number of crimes of violence committed annu~I ly 
in which.convictions result from the us~ of what are 
I ega I I y defined as "dangerous weapons". 
(d) the number of firearms among these "dangerous weapons" 
(e) the number of i I legally possessed firearms which 
are traced back to their legal owners (type, make, 
ca I i bre etc) 
(f) Analysis of the types of firearms (i.e., divided 
into categories, eg; 211 snub-nose revolver or doubl~­
barrel led shotgun etc.,) and ammunition (i .e.,cal ibre, 
factory or home loaded etc.,) involved in crime. 
Perhaps there are other variables than the above which are worthy 
of recording but which do not readily spring to mind. However, 
the fact that figures for the above six major greas of con~ern are 
not presently kept, emphasises the inadequacy of current record-
keeping methods. 
It is hoped that the findings of this study, together with 
the suggestions which fol low may assist in some smal I way 
not only in furthering our knowledge of the issue investigated, 
but also in furthering the cause of rational administration 
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